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Kathleen Addison
Steven Wardinski

Hibernophobia or Philia in English Perceptions of the Irishman: A Study of Elizabethan and Early Stuart Commentaries on the Irish Character

By Michael Ballagh

In his essay on English images of the Irish, David Hayton argues that historians have tended to avoid discussions of the "disagreeable practice" of creating social stereotypes of supposedly inferior national or ethnic groups, unless this analysis incorporates themes of a "subtle and sinister weapon of colonial exploitation." Research, he contends, has focused on those periods in which the English caricature of the Irish can be seen as justification of "imperialist" policies.[1] Hence, during the Elizabethan era, as Ireland experienced increasing "colonial subjugation,"[2] numerous contemporary commentators emphasized the need to "reform" and "control" the Irish population.

Tracing the evolution of English-generated Irish caricatures, Hayton suggests that in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the inhabitants of Ireland became more generally regarded as figures of fun rather than the menacing papal anti-Christs of the earlier Elizabethan and Stuart periods. At the center of this shift in perception was the decreasing element of fear. The victories of Cromwell and William of Orange diminished the supposed prowess of the Irish warrior; the consolidation of the Established English church after the Restoration, and the decrease in international, geo-political threats from Spain and France diminished the Irish

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[1] David Hayton, "From Barbarian to Burlesque: English Images of the Irish c. 1660-1750," *Irish Economic and Social History* 15 (1988), 5.

[2] "Colonial Subjugation" meant many different things in Elizabethan Ireland: To some such as Barnabie Rich, subjugation implied the complete eradication of papists on the island - a group who promoted and carried out revolt against the English crown; to Edmund Spenser, the implementation of a British style political administration including English laws, political institutions and administrative divisions (shires and hundreds) was at the forefront

Catholic threat by the end of the seventeenth century. On a broader level, the perceived fear of a Catholic universal hegemony had largely dissipated by the eighteenth century.[3]

This paper analyzes in greater detail perceptions of fear or ridicule toward the Irishman in the Elizabethan and early Stuart era. Is Hayton's contention that fear dominated English perceptions of the Irishman valid for the period 1558-1610?[4] Do contemporary assessments fit the colonial mindset of criticizing an inferior race in need of civilizing by its colonial masters? Such an interpretation assuredly over-simplifies attitudes toward the Irish. Can one identify any more magnanimous or complex comments on the Irish at this time? Can one simply dismiss English characterizations of the Irish as racist and imperialist diatribes?

While numerous contemporaries wrote about various issues of Irish society - the polity, the landscape, the economic and social conditions of Ireland in the sixteenth century, this paper concentrates primarily on descriptions and critiques of the Irishman's character. The decision to focus on the Elizabethan era incorporates a number of considerations. A group of Irish historians recently have sought to address what they justifiably consider a lack of studies on Tudor Ireland. In returning to the sources in the classical revisionist approach, they have re-examined and reinterpreted almost every aspect of Tudor policy in Ireland.[5] The majority of these excellent works remain political studies. No recent works have sought to re-evaluate English perceptions

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of "colonialism." Other commentators on the English policy in Ireland focused on the economic aspects of colonialism - notably "plantations" to force the native Irish out of profitable areas of the island.

[3] See Steven C. A. Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[4] While the dates may appear arbitrary, they have been employed to incorporate the writings of the five principal authors analyzed in the paper - Edmund Campion, Richard Stanyhurst, John Derricke, Edmund Spenser and Barnabie Rich. While each of them wrote about Ireland in the Elizabethan era, Rich's works were not written until the early seventeenth century, a date which must be acknowledged in his critique.

[5] See for example, Ciaran Brady, *The Chief Governors: The Rise and Fall of Reform Government in Tudor Ireland, 1536-1588* (Cambridge University Press, 1994); Brendan Bradshaw, *The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 1979); Nicholas Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A*

of the Irishman in the Elizabethan era.[6] The second reason for this focus on the age of Elizabeth and James concerns the preponderance of published works at this time. With the growing numbers of English settling in Ireland or at the very least considering a move across the Irish Sea, a group of notable English figures, many of whom had either lived in Ireland for generations, participated in the military campaigns or simply wished to travel around this country, wrote a number of works describing the social life and people in Ireland. Moreover, the Elizabethan era constitutes a vital age in the colonization of Ireland through the imposition of English governmental and administrative institutions and the beginnings of the plantations on the island.[7]

This paper will focus on five individuals, all of whom had considerable knowledge of Ireland in the late sixteenth-century: Edmund Campion, Richard Stanyhurst, John Derricke, Edmund Spenser and Barnabie Rich. Admittedly other short-term visitors to the country retained their own beliefs about the island's populace but, their English bias notwithstanding, the five authors discussed here viewed Irish society first-hand for a number of years. Only one of them, Richard Stanyhurst, can be described justly as "Old English"; namely, a descendant of the original Norman invasion of Ireland in the twelfth century. One might assume that he was able to look at the Irish social system with some sympathy and understanding. One can identify clear divergences in opinion between the "Old" and "New" English (the Protestant settlers of the sixteenth century). While the former group undoubtedly saw themselves as categorically of

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Pattern Established (Hassocks, 1976); idem, *Reformation to Restoration: Ireland, 1534-1660* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988).

[6] In contrast, Kathleen M. Noonan provides an excellent discussion of perceptions of the Irishman in seventeenth-century England; see Kathleen M. Noonan, "'The Cruell Pressure of an Enraged, Barbarous People': Irish and English Identity in Seventeenth-Century Policy and Propaganda," *Historical Journal* 41, no. 1 (1998), 151- 177.

[7] See Nicholas Canny, "The Permissive Frontier: The Problem of Social Control in English Settlements in Ireland and Virginia, 1550-1650," in K.R Andrews, N.P. Canny and P.E.H. Hair, eds., *The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic and America, 1480-1650* (Detroit: Wayne Sate University Press, 1979), 16-42;

English stock, their knowledge and perceptions of the Irish character were assuredly more developed (if no less biased) than their recently arrived compatriots, who understood Ireland as either a land of immense economic opportunity or as a vanguard of Roman Catholicism. In this regard, both Stanyhurst and Campion also differed from the other writers by virtue of their Catholicism.[8] Can one detect a sympathetic view from these two toward their religious compatriots irrespective of differences in ethnic identity?

The final three writers under study, Derricke, Spenser and Rich, were unashamedly Protestant, and all arrived in Ireland either in an administrative or military capacity. Spenser, who was employed as Lord Grey's secretary, held a residence in County Kildare (in the Pale), provided services to the Presidency Council of Munster, had experience as a planter in county Cork, and could presumably speak of the Irish with a considerable degree of authority. Rich's writings provide an insight into the evolution of an Englishman's attitude toward the Irish. Arriving in Ireland with Essex in 1573, Rich continued to return there until 1617. In that time, he published *A Short Survey of Ireland* (1609) and *A New Description of Ireland* (1610). While David Beers Quinn sees Rich's primary role being one of denouncing popery in Ireland, he must nonetheless have come to learn a great deal about the Irish character over the course of forty years in Ireland.[9] Once again, it will be interesting to note whether a pre-existing knowledge of the Irish character in fact implied a sympathetic voice or, in contrast, a highly critical one. While all three spent a large part of their lives residing in Ireland, did their nominal status as English officials in Ireland imply an overt hostility toward the local population?

Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established* (Hassocks, 1976); idem, *Reformation to Restoration*.

[8] While admittedly Stanyhurst did not convert until after his departure from Ireland, one can assume that he harbored sympathies toward Catholicism, if not Irish Catholics, while still in Ireland.

According to Quinn, most of the English commentators wanted to know about Irishmen "in order to learn how to turn them into Englishmen." Some of them recorded Irish traits in order to have a precise conception of what "to destroy, others to have material for satire."[10] Quinn's assessment seems unduly harsh: this paper will contend that instances of toleration and even admiration came through in some of the writings. Another question concerns the supposed racial superiority of the Englishman over his Irish subject.[11] Do the authors in question identify an "innate" or "natural" inferiority in the Irish person? At the forefront of such a question lies the following conundrum: Did the writers chastise, condemn and ridicule the Irish because of their very Irish ethnic identity, or are other issues at play here?

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Upon her accession, Elizabeth inherited a nation on the verge of bankruptcy following mismanagement under the administrations of Edward and Mary. The stronghold of English administration in Ireland remained in the "Pale" -a strip of territory on the East Coast of Ireland that incorporated the capital, Dublin, seat of the Irish House of Commons and Lord Deputy, and the greater province of Leinster. Both Munster and Ulster continued to resist English encroachment throughout Elizabeth's reign.[12] The 1560s witnessed renewed attempts to reestablish English authority over Ireland and generated dreams of conquest and colonization, primarily through the subjugation of Irish lords.[13] Under Henry Sidney, the Lord Deputy of Ireland, the Elizabethan government sought to bring all of Ireland under English control through

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[9] David B. Quinn, *The Elizabethans and the Irish* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 31.
[10] Ibid., 21.
[11] While a few of the authors do mention Irish women, it is often included as an aside and the writers give little emphasis to the female Irish population.
[12] See below for an overview of the Desmond rebellion in Munster and the O'Neill uprising in Ulster.
[13] William Palmer, *The Problem of Ireland in Tudor Foreign Policy, 1485-1603* (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 1994), 89.

colonization. Steven Ellis remarks that the 1560s witnessed a changing attitude toward Ireland as a destination. No longer an area of honorable exile for mediocre talents, Ireland became a significant prize for ambitious English court aristocrats who hoped to get rich quick on the abundance of land made available to them upon conquest and colonization.[14] This emphasis on colonization will prove important when assessing the contemporary portrayals of sixteenth-century Ireland – inevitably, as any good real estate agent will agree, one must provide a positive image of the property if one wishes to convince the buyer or would-be colonizer of the merits of moving west to Ireland.[15] The arrival of large numbers of new colonizers also exacerbated the differences between the "Old" and the "New" English. The former group, though determined to retain their privileged position in government in Ireland, advocated a more conciliatory position toward the native population. They often prefaced remarks on political reform with expressions of "their natural affection" for their "native country."[16] In contrast, the new English supported tougher measures on the native population as they eyed the large tracts of land that would become available from forced confiscature.

If the majority of English who arrived in Ireland envisaged a glorious campaign to subjugate the native population and occupy land, Edmund Campion moved to the island under threat of arrest for religious heresy. A fellow of Oxford, and reputedly "always a sound Catholic in his heart,"[17] despite taking the Oath of Supremacy under Elizabeth, Campion proceeded to

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[14] Steven G. Ellis, *Tudor Ireland in the Age of the Tudors, 1447:1603: English Expansion and the End of Gaelic Rule* (New York: Longman Press, 1998), 245.
[15] I will discuss the "positive" attributes of the Irish below.
[16] Brendan Bradshaw, *The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, 1979), 276-77. In fact, the study of Richard Stanyhurst will demonstrate that Bradshaw's statement appears incorrect - Stanyhurst, an "Old" English in Ireland, harbored little sympathy for his Irish neighbors. See below for an assessment of Stanyhurst's attitudes toward the Irish.
[17] Campion would eventually be executed at Tyburn in 1581 for "treason."

Ireland in 1569 where he stayed with James Stanyhurst,[18] then Recorder of Dublin and Speaker of the House of Commons, and his son Richard. Campion was distrusted (rightly so) for being a papist, and orders were given for his arrest. While evading arrest, he worked on his *History of Ireland.*[19]

The unashamed Catholicism of Campion clearly demonstrates itself throughout the book: the story of medieval Ireland chronicles "the holy men and abbeys" and laments the passing of the old religious benefactions of the Middle Ages. In his chapter on saints he recalls "the memory of God's friends, more glorious to a Realme than all the victories and triumphs of the world."[20] Nonetheless, he also acknowledges the failings of the Roman clergy and sees the Irish as too ready to give credit to "idle miracles." In asserting the ancient authority of the English crown in Ireland, Campion commends Henry VIII's control over the "sawcynesses of the Priest."[21]

His dedication to Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester underscores the possibility that Campion had not yet thrown himself completely into the sectarian imbroglio. The dedication itself contains a neutral prose that in no way prefigures Campion's later commitment to the Catholic cause:

> ...that my travaile into Ireland might seeme neither causlesse, nor fruitlesse, I have thought it expedient…to yield you this poore book, as an accompt of my poore voyage… by the patronage of this Booke, you may be induced to weigh the estate and become a patron to this noble Realme.[22]

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[18] See below for an account of Stanyhurst's own depiction of the Irish in Ralph Holinshed's *Chronicles.*
[19] Sydney Lee, ed., *Dictionary of National Biography* (London: Macmillan Company, 1909), 5: 851.
[20] Edmund Campion, *A Historie of Ireland* (1571), Rudolf B. Gottfried, ed. (New York: Scholars' Facsimiles, 1940), 42. Campion's book did not get published until 1577, when it comprised part of Raphael Holinshed's *Chronicles* (1577).
[21] Ibid., 116, 119.
[22] Ibid., "The Epistle Dedicatory," n.p.

His recommendation that the Protestant Leicester invest in Ireland hardly suggests that Campion sought to protect a valuable papist vanguard on the island.

Unlike other English chroniclers of Ireland, Campion did have the good grace to admit that his assessment of the people and culture would have been greatly enhanced if he had understood the native language: "I am perswaded that with choice and judgement, I might have sucked thence some better store of matter, and gladly would have sought them, had I found an interpreter, or understood their tongue..."[23] He praises the elegance of the Irish tongue and claims it "offereth great occasion to quicke apothegmes and proper allusions, wherefore their common jesters, Bards and Rymers, are said to delight passingly those that conceive the grace and propriety of the tongue." Yet, while acknowledging the cultural finery of the language, he argues that only one in one hundred can either write, read or understand it.[24]

Campion's assessment of the dispositions of the Irish people retains a considerable degree of flattering statements:

> The people are thus inclined; religious franke, amorous, irefull, sufferable, of paine infinite, very glorious, many sorcerers, excellent horsemen, delighted with Warres, great almes-givers, passing in hospitalitie: the lewder sort... are sensuall and loose to lechery above measure. The same being vertuously bred up or reformed, are such mirrours of holinesse and austeritie, that other Nations retaine but a shewe or shadow of devotion in comparison of them.[25]

In contrast to later writers who would condemn the revolt-inciting bards and poets,[26] Campion describes these literary figures as "sharp-witted, lovers of learning, capable of any studie

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[23] Ibid., Dedication to the "Loving Reader", n.p.
[24] Ibid., 12. A rather curious observation considering if no one could understand the native language, how did the inhabitants communicate with each other? Outside of the Pale, few Irish aside from Anglo-Irish landowners would have spoken English.
[25] Ibid., 13.
[26] In particular Barnabie Rich and Edmund Spenser harbored a distinct distrust of the bards; see below.

whereunto they bend themselves, constant in travaile, adventurours, intractable, kinde-hearted…"[27]

If later Elizabethan and Jacobean chroniclers of the Irish populace would focus their contempt on the papist influence on the island, one might assume that Campion would have harbored a degree of sympathy toward his co-religionists.[28] Ironically, the brunt of Campion's criticism focuses on superstitious practices and roguish priests. The Irish, he argues, "are lightly abused and to believe and avouche idle miracles and revelations." Campion ill-disguises his horror at the primeval wakes, where "they follow the dead corpses to the grave with howlings and barbarous out-cryes, pittyfull in appearance," whence grew the proverb, he conjectures, "to weep Irish."[29]

Campion's work can scarcely be called a serious work on the history of Ireland – rather, it is a pamphlet written to prove that education is the only means to tame the Irish. A shared religion notwithstanding, Campion critically assesses the ignorance and naiveté of the populace. He recounts the epistle of an Irish monk - an entertaining and highly dubious story that Campion appears to believe without question:

> …I found a fragment of an epistle, wherin a vertuous Monke declareth, that to him (travailing in Ulster) came a brave Gentleman desirous to be confessed… whom in all his life had never received the blessed Sacrament. When he said his minde, the Priest demaunded him, whether he were faultlesse in the sinne of Homicide? Hee answered, that hee never wisht the matter to be heinous before, but being instructed therof, hee confessed the murther of five, the rest hee left wounded...[30]

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[27] Ibid., 14.
[28] See in particular the critique of Barnabie Rich; see below.
[29] Campion, *A Historie*, 13-14.
[30] Ibid., 15-16.

His focus on education as a means to "enlighten" the Irish underscores the non-sectarian element of Campion's writings -- he makes no claims for an exclusively Roman Catholic education, but rather focuses on the heinous teaching conditions that now exist:

> ...learned in their common schooles of leachcraft and law... I have seene them where they kept Schoole, ten in some one Chamber, groveling upon couches of straw, their Bookes at their noses, themselves lying flatte prostate, and so to chaunte out their lessons by peece-meale, being the most part lustie fellowes of twenty five yeares and upwards.[31]

Campion, while Catholic, was first and foremost an Englishman, and it is through these eyes that he writes about Ireland. Nonetheless, his criticism of social conditions within the country does not necessarily imply a critique of the populace itself. One can even detect a certain sympathy for those Irish who lived in substandard conditions. Irrespective of the religious neutrality in his prose, Campion undoubtedly eschews the vitriolic condemnation of the Irish population which later Protestant English commentaries would publish. Yet Campion rarely displays any profound sympathy for his fellow Catholics in Ireland. If he was not imbued with a sectarian hatred, he nonetheless harbored contempt toward the Irish native. Undoubtedly, the reason behind this apparent contradiction lay in Campion's profound belief in the supremacy of *English* Catholicism. Far from the idolatrous and superstitious practices of the Irish Catholics, Campion clearly distinguishes this form of the papal faith from what he considers to be his own intellectually and spiritually more sophisticated notion of Catholicism. Ironically, unlike later English Protestant writers such as Barnabie Rich, who condemn the Irish on the basis of their religious sympathies rather than on ethnic grounds, Campion directs his approbation specifically

[31] Ibid., 20.

at the *Irishness* of the islanders. Ethnicity, and the ways in which it has created an "inferior" form of Irish Catholicism, plays a central role in Campion's critique.

Richard Stanyhurst, who grew up in Ireland before moving to Oxford in 1563, came in contact with Edmund Campion and would later return with him to Ireland, whereupon he devoted himself to Irish history and geography. Under Campion's guidance, he undertook to contribute an essay to Raphael Holinshed's collection of Irish chronicles. Stanyhurst's *Description of Ireland* would appear in Holinshed's first volume of the Chronicles in 1577.[32]

Despite his later conversion to Roman Catholicism, it is clear that Stanyhurst like Campion harbored little fondness for the Irish populace. He makes a clear distinction between the Anglo-Irish of the Pale and the "meere" Irish to be found outside this region of "civility." He forewarns the reader "not to impute anie barbarous custome that shall be here laid downe, to the citizens, townesmen, and inhabitants of the English pale."[33] The rest of his work can only be described as an ill-disguised plagiarism of Campion's own work. His positive descriptions of the Irish employ the exact same adjectives ("religious, franke, amorous etc.") and he copies word for word Campion's own recitation of the Irish funeral and the origins of "to weepe Irish."[34] The final section unsurprisingly reiterates the importance of education to reform the Irish. Indeed Stanyhurst acknowledges his debt to Campion but denies that he has in any way directly plagiarized from his friend:

> I, as one of the most that could doo least, was fullie resolved to inrich maister Campion his chronicle with further additions. But weighing on the other side, that my course packthred could not have beene sutablie knit with his fine silke, and what a disgrace it were, bungerlie to botch up a rich garment, by clouting it with

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[32] *Dictionary of National Biography*, 18: 976-77.
[33] Richard Stanyhurst, *A Treatise Conteining a Pleine and Perfect Description of Ireland*, in *Holinshed's Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland*, vol. vi . 1577. Reprint (New York: AMS Press Inc., 1965), 6: 66-67.
[34] Ibid., 67.

> patches of sundrie colours, I was forthwith reclaimed from my former resolution, reckoning it for better, that my pen should walke in such wise in that craggie and balkish waie, as the truth of the matter being sorprised, I would neither openlie borrow, nor privilie imbezell ought to anie great purpose from his historie.[35]

Yet while Stanyhurst mimicked Campion's "praise" of the Irish, he gained a reputation for his brutal slandering of the Irish populace. Ironically, Barnabie Rich, himself hardly a great hibernophile, would castigate Stanyhurst for his "want of sympathy with the native Irish" and his prejudiced misrepresentations.[36] Geoffrey Keating in his *General History of Ireland* (1723) condemns Stanyhurst on three grounds: he was too young when he wrote the book; he was ignorant of the Irish language (which unlike Campion, he failed to acknowledge); and he was bribed by large gifts and promises of advancement to blacken the character of the Irish nation. Unfortunately, Keating does not substantiate the final claim.[37] Keating goes on to add that Stanyhurst later "repented of the injustice he had been guilty of" and promised to revoke any falsehoods in a paper to be printed in Ireland – although no evidence of such a paper exists.[38] Irrespective of his later recantation, it is clear that despite his long history in Ireland as part of the "Old English," Stanyhurst did not hold a great fondness for the native population who surrounded him.

Of the Protestant writers on Ireland, little is known of John Derricke, author of *The Image of Ireland* (1578), save that he may have been employed to make the great seal of Ireland in 1557.[39] As a follower of Sir Philip Sidney, the Lord Deputy of Ireland, and friend of his son,

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[35] *Chronicles*, VI, sig. b3^{v}. Cited in Campion, *A Historie of Ireland*, iv.
[36] Barnabie Rich, *A new description of Ireland: wherein is described the disposition of the Irish whereunto they are inclined. No lesse admirable to be perused then credible to be beleeved: neither unprofitable nor unpleasant to bee read and understood, by those worthy citizens of London that be now undertakers in Ireland* (London, 1610), 2.
[37] Geoffrey Keating, *The General History of Ireland*. Trans. Dermod O'Connor (London, 1723), xii.
[38] Ibid.
[39] *Dictionary of National Biography*, 6: 289-90.

Philip, we can only surmise that Derricke spent a number of years resident in Ireland. In *The Image*, Derricke does not make a blanket condemnation of the Irish. Rather he clearly distinguishes between those Irish "who affirm their dissolute life, and inordinate lying, better to pertaine into infidelles and heathen," from "all other in generall of the saied land, being lovers of vertue, and inhancers of civilitie."[40] The degenerate populace of the island are those soldiers, "Woodkarnes," who persist in rebellion against the English crown. He beseeches his readers "not to deeme the reprehension of these wilde wanton woodkarne, to bee spoken of all menne in general, which is here ment but of some, of those, I saie, that are rebelles to our (Queene), enemies to peace, and disturbers of the common wealthe."[41] Derricke's comments underscore a common element in critiques of the Irish populace – attacks on resistance to the Protestant reformation and a persistent nationalist (anti-English) sentiment, rather than issues of racial inferiority, predominate in their writings.

Derricke's treatise focuses less on the barbarous characteristics of an entire race than on the threat of revolt and the ensuing threat to the stability of the Commonwealth. The author deems the English campaigns in Ireland as a war against insurrection rather than a comprehensive policy of "ethnic cleansing."[42] In this respect, his gaze centers on the northern regions of the island where revolt has become commonplace. The O'Neill dynasty in Ireland

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[40] John Derricke, *The image of Irelande, with a discouerie of vvoodkarne, wherin is moste liuely expressed, the nature, and qualitie of the saied wilde Irishe woodkarne, their notable aptnesse, celeritie, and pronesse to rebellion, and by waie of argumente is manifested their originall, and ofspryng, their descent and pedigree: also their habite and apparell, is there plainly showne. The execrable life, and miserable death of Rorie Roge, that famous archtraitour to God and the croune (otherwise called Rorie Oge) is like wise discribed. Lastlie the commyng in of Thyrlaghe Leonaghe the greate Oneale of Irelande, with the effecte of his submission, to the right honourable Sir Henry Sidney (Lorde Deputie of the saiedlande) is thereto adioyned. Made and deuised by Ihon Derricke, anno 1578. and now published and set forthe by the saied authour this present yere of our Lorde 1581. for pleasure and delight of the well disposed reade* (London, 1581), epistle, n.p.

[41] Ibid., n.p.

continued to plague the English authorities in the late sixteenth century. In the 1560s, the English authorities were becoming increasingly frustrated with Shane O'Neill and the "customary right and lordship" over the province of Ulster. In 1566, frustrated with the intransigence of Elizabeth to honor "the traditional claims of his dynasty," O'Neill sought the help of the French court and began a brief military campaign across Ulster. After sacking Armagh, O'Neill was eventually defeated in 1567 and his head was impaled on a spike on the wall at Dublin Castle.[43]

In reaction to the hostilities, Derricke argued that this was not a war against all Ireland: "warre is not raged against the Queene's freendes, nor yet a battell fought, save onely against her enemies."[44] In the body of his text, Derricke clearly expounds on the wonders of the country, its natural beauty and honest inhabitants. It is only through the pernicious deeds of the rebellious "sort" that Ireland has undergone a transformation from a peaceful country to one dominated by bloodshed and revolt. "The love of rebelles," he concludes, "is in plaguing of true men."[45]

While not a military man, the poet Edmund Spenser maintained an official administrative post throughout his time in Ireland. He first began visiting Ireland in 1578 as part of an assignment to deliver dispatches to the Earl of Leicester's correspondents in foreign countries. In search of more assured preferment, Spenser accepted the post of secretary to Arthur Grey, Lord Grey de Wilton who was appointed Lord Deputy of Ireland in 1580. Although Spenser returned to England in 1589-90 and 1596, Ireland remained his home until 1598, within a month of his

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[42] While the term "ethnic cleansing" is undoubtedly an anachronism to Elizabethan Ireland, one could argue that it was exactly such a policy that Edmund Spenser espoused.
[43] GA Hayes McCoy, "Concilation, Coercion and the Protestant Reformation," in T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin and F.J. Byren, eds., *A New History of Ireland, Vol. III. Early Modern Ireland* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 84-86.
[44] Derricke, *The Image of Ireland*, n.p.
[45] Ibid., fl^{v}.

death. It is clear that Spenser knew a great deal about Irish matters. In 1580 he accompanied Grey to Kerry and described "Those late Warres in Mounster"[46] following the Uprising of the Earl of Desmond. Throughout the 1570s the local lords of both Munster and Connaught opposed the provincial Presidencies. Imprisoned in England, the fifteenth earl of Desmond was permitted to return to his Munster stronghold in 1573. After a series of aborted uprisings, Desmond revolted in 1580 in defense of the Catholic faith and to oppose Englishmen who "go about to overrun our country and make it their own."[47] Over a period of three years English forces hunted down and wiped out the Desmond army and laid waste to the province of Munster - a result for which Spenser held the Irish responsible.[48]

Aside from his duties as a chronicler of the Desmond campaign, Spenser also held posts in Dublin as a transcriber and collator of official documents, and he held the clerkship of the Irish court of Chancery from 1581 to 1588. In 1588 he took up the post of clerk of the Council of Munster.[49] In addition to official posts in Ireland, Spenser also acquired a considerable amount of property, as he first purchased estates in County Kildare in the Pale and later benefited from the forfeiture of the Desmond estates in Cork.[50]

Possibly written in 1586, Spenser first makes reference to the Irish in book two of the *Faerie Queene*. Herein, we find his first accounts of the savagery of the Irish:

> A thousand villeins round about them swarmed
> Out of the rockes and caves adioyning nye,

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[46] See below for more of Spenser's description of the effects of the Munster uprising.
[47] Richard Cox, *Hibernica Anglicana*, I (1689), 361; cited in G.A. Hayes McCoy, "Tudor Conquest and Counter-Reformation, 1571-1603," in Moody et al, *A New History of Ireland, vol. III. Early Modern Ireland* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 107.
[48] Hayes McCoy, "Tudor Conquest," 108-09.
[49] In Elizabethan Ireland, the Lord Deputy was responsible for all Ireland but only had direct control over the English Pale and Leinster. Connaught and Munster were administered under the deputy by a President and council on the model of the North of England and the Welsh Marches.
[50] *Dictionary of National Biography*, 18: 795-800.

> Vile caytive wretches, ragged, rude, deformd,
> All threatning death, all in straunge manner armd,
> Some with unweldy clubs, some with long speares,
> Some rusty knives, some steves in fire warmd.
> Sterne was their looke, like wild amazed steares,
> Staring with hollow eyes, and stiff upstanding heares.[51]

The physical characteristics of the Irishman, his demonic features as described by Spenser, seem reminiscent of the later "hell" paintings of the Flemish artist Pieter Brueghel (the Younger). The obvious imagery of the servants of a papal anti-Christ can hardly have escaped the readers of Spenser's poem. The ferocious and barbaric Irishman of David Hayton's depiction is clearly present in Spenser's portrayal.

Spenser's most elaborate work on the country, *A View of the Present State of Ireland* was written in 1596 after Spenser had had over sixteen years of experience in Ireland. Licensed for issue in April 1598, *A View* was not published until 1633, as part of an appendix to James Ware's *Historie of Ireland,* when Strafford allowed its printing as proof of the need for a strong government in Ireland.[52]

Spenser wrote of Ireland altogether from the point of view of an Elizabethan Englishman. Indeed he castigated the Anglo-Irish ascendancy there for degenerating into something akin to an Irishman:

> [O]ther greate howses there bee of the old English, in Ireland, which through lycentious conversinge with the Irishe, or marryinge and fosteringe with them, or

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[51] Edmund Spenser, *The Faerie Queene*. J.C. Smith, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), Book ii, Canto ix, Stanza xiii.

[52] Edmund Spenser, *A View of the Present State of Ireland*. W.L. Renwick, ed. (London: Scholartis Press, 1934), 250. Ciaran Brady argues that unlike the "orthodox" interpretation of the publication history of *A View*, Spenser's work failed to be published in 1598 because of his contention that English common law would prove useless as a means of reforming Ireland; see Ciaran Brady, "The Road to the View: On the Decline of Reform Thought in Tudor Ireland," in Patricia Coughlan, ed., *Spenser and Ireland: An Interdisciplinary Perspective* (Cork: Mercier Press, 1989), 25-40.

> lack of meete Nature, or other such unhappie occasions have degndred from theire antient dignities and are now growen as Irish as o'hanlans breach.[53]

He allowed no recognition of Irish claims and rights - English laws should be enforced and Irish nationalism uprooted by the sword. He shared a common Elizabethan belief that the Irish might justly and wisely be expropriated from their lands and, as far as possible, exterminated. James Ware, the initial printer, deplored Spenser's want of charity in his blueprint for the subjugation of the island.[54]

Spenser's commentary on the Irish populace was undoubtedly vicious, but must be seen in light of the political realities of Ireland on the eve of the seventeenth century. Aside from the constant Irish threats, the instrument of English control was shaky at the very least. Officials without security of tenure and without a service tradition found themselves amid the pressures of colonial development and the vagaries of court intrigue and politicking. External threats from the Spanish consistently dogged any sense of English security in Ireland. Spenser's critical posturing vis-à-vis the Irish increased in the light of the rebellious stance of Hugh O'Neill, the Earl of Tyrone. Although Spenser would not live to witness O'Neill's eventual defeat, he did watch with horror as Tyrone instigated a revolt in 1597 that spread throughout the country as the rebel lord called on the "gentlemen of Munster" to join the Ulster Confederacy and to "make war with us."[55] Hence, *A View* was written at a time of considerable anxiety.

Spenser was genuinely interested in Ireland and while he disapproved of the fighting casts, he praised their gallantry, military aptitude and horsemanship. In his assessment of the "Kearne," the "proper Irish souldyer," he remarks that they:

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[53] Ibid., 86.
[54] *Dictionary of National Biography*, 18: 800.

> ...are verie valyante and hardy for the most parte greate endurors of could, labour hunger and all hardnesse, verie active and stronge of hande, very swifte of foote, verie vigilante and circumspecte in their enterprises, verie presente in perills, verie greate scorners of death.[56]

Yet it would be a misinterpretation to assume that Spenser called for the blood and death of all Irish. In his description of the devastation of the Munster famine caused by the Desmond wars, the emotion is hardly gloating, but rather horrified:

> ...that ritch and plentifull countrye had been reduced to "such wretchednes, as that any stone harte would have rewed the same, out of everie Corner of the woodes and glennes they came creping forth upon theire handes, for their legges could not beare them, they looked Anatomies of death, they spake like ghostes cryinge out of their graves, they did eate of the dead Carrions, happye were they could fynde them, yea, and one another soone after in so much as the verie Carcases they spared not to scrape out of their graves... in shorte space ther were none almost left and a most populous and plentyfull Countrye suddenlie lefte voyde of man or beast...[57]

One might have assumed that Spenser would advocate a similar end for the rest of the Irish population. In contrast, the author's clearly laid-out plan for the subjugation and occupation of the island was to be extremely well organized, such that "the end I assure will bee verie shorte and much soner."[58] In this regard, *A View* is indeed a blueprint for successful colonization of Ireland.

Unlike later commentators such as Rich, Spenser did not involve himself in frontal attacks on the Roman Catholic religion and the ways in which it "infected" the populace with rebellious attitudes. Indeed, the author harbored a certain admiration for those popish priests who "come out of Spaine from Rome from Rennes by longe toyle and dangerous travell hether,

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[55] Hayes McCoy, "Tudor Conquest," 121-23.
[56] Spenser, *A View*, 93-94.
[57] Ibid., 135.

where they knowe perill of death awayteth them and noe rewarde nor ritches, is too found onelye to drawe the people to the church of Rome."[59] Spenser's comments neither castigated the priests themselves nor the populace who embraced their teachings. Moreover, the author even doubts the religiosity of the Irish: "Moste of the Irishe are farr from understanding of the popishe religion as they are of the protestantes profession, and yet doe they hate yt, though unknowen, even for the verie hatred which they have of the English and theire government."[60] Hence Spenser ironically criticizes the Irish not simply for being papists but moreover for not even being good papists. William Lyon, Bishop of Cork mirrors this observation in a letter to Lord Hunsdon in 1596:

> A great part of the people of this kingdom are no better than mere infidels, having but a bare name of Christians, without any knowledge of Christ or light of his truth, in that I myself have examined divers of them, being sixty years of age and upwards, and have found them not able to say the Lord's prayer, or the articles of the Christian faith, neither in English, Latin, nor Irish.[61]

Spenser's comments prove interesting for his observation on the Irish hatred for anything British, but also underscore a curious anomaly that showed itself in the later writings of Barnabie Rich. Rich castigated the Irish for their commitment to popishness, whereas, if Spenser or Lyon are to believed, they had little interest in any tenets of Christianity save rejecting English Protestantism. Spenser further added that this hatred of Reformation stems from a history of subjugation. They recalled how in the past they were "subdued, and they were thrust owt of all theire possessions.

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[58] Ibid., 135.
[59] Ibid., 209.
[60] Ibid., 208.
[61] *Calendar of State Papers Ireland, 1597-97* (London: H.M.S.O., 1893), 16.

So as now they feare that yf they were againe brought under, they should likewise bee expelled owte of all which is the cause that they hate Englishe government."[62]

Spenser foresaw the O'Neill rebellion two years before its instigation and while his recommendations on how to respond to such lawlessness are suitably savage, one senses that the author can easily understand why the Irish should wish to revolt: "They should all ryse generallie into Rebellion and caste away the English subjection, to which there is now little wanteth."[63]

In contrast, Barnabie Rich in his initial writings on Ireland, saw little or no reason why the Irish should wish to rebel against a "just and mercifull" crown. Rich was a career soldier and part-time writer who participated in a number of military campaigns in Ireland. Originally enlisting as a soldier in Mary's campaigns against France, he rose to captain after the campaigns in the Low Countries. While he appears to have taken a role in the efforts of Walter Devereaux, the first Earl of Essex to colonize the country -- a campaign that ended disastrously[64] -- he spent most of his life in Dublin where, in times of peace, he tried to make a career from his pen. While dubbing himself a "gentleman," he admits that he is no scholar: "I am a souldier, a protested souldier, better practised in my pike than in my penne."[65] In 1584, he resumed his military duty in Ireland after Sir John Perot became Lord Deputy of Ireland.[66]

While Rich repeatedly slammed the rebellious Irish, he argued that this intractability stemmed less from any inherent disobedience than the anathematical influence of the papist religion. His first major work on the Irish, *A Short Survey of Ireland* purports to outline the

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[62] Spenser, *A View*, 121.
[63] Ibid., 122.
[64] Centrally planned and highly structured colonies were first attempted in Ireland during the 1570s by Sir Thomas Smith and Walter Devereux, Earl of Essex. Neither of these private campaigns met with any success and in the future, the government played a more active role in English colonization in Ireland. See Canny, "The Permissive Frontier," 18-19, and for a more detailed analysis, Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland.*
[65] Barnabie Rich, *A Short Survey of Ireland* (London, 1609), a3^{R}

geographical and human characteristics of the island in the Elizabethan era; in reality, he simply launches into a diatribe on the dangers of the papal anti-Christ in universal terms. His dedicatory preface presents the Irish situation as critical in the aftermath of Elizabeth's "milde and mercifull allurements" in that country:

> The people were never more forward, never more obstinate, never more perverse, nor the state of that kingdome, never more desperate than it is at this houre, confused as well in the true knowledge appertayning unto God, as in their duetie and obedience belonging to their Prince, where the people are daily seduced, infected and perverted by Jesuites, Seminaries and other runnagate Priests the ministers of Antichrist, wherewith the Country doth swarme, and have so mightily prevailed, that they have wrought a generall contempt, aswell against his Majestie himselfe, as against his godly proceedings.[67]

The policy of "colonization" continued in Jacobean Ireland, namely an exploitation that served both English purposes and private interests. Early Stuart attempts to subjugate the Irish populace were explicitly reformative.[68] One must understand Rich in light of an English principle which argued that the resistance of the native Irish could be most successfully overcome through a "civilizing" process. For Rich, such "civilizing" wholly concerned the spread of Protestantism in papist Ireland.

In spite of his sectarian goals, like Derricke, Rich was careful not to present a blanket condemnation of all the Irish populace. If Derricke's inhabitants had found themselves accursed by prevailing nationalistic or rebellious influences, Rich identifies a plethora of "seducing spirits," the priests that "are planted in all the parts of that Realme, that if there be one that will

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[66] *Dictionary of National Biography*, 18: 991-92.

[67] Rich, *A short survey of Ireland. Truely discouering who it is that hath so armed the hearts of that people with disobedience to their prince. With a description of the countrey, and the condition of the people. No lesse necessarie and needfull to be respected by the English, then requisite and behoouefull to be reformed in the Irish* (London, 1609), a2^{R}.

[68] Aidan Clarke, "Pacification, Plantation and the Catholic Question, 1603-23," in Moody et al, *A New History of Ireland, voumel III,* 187.

stand for the King, there is twentie for that one to maintaine the Pope."[69] The Catholic, rather than a specifically Irish threat, remained paramount in Rich's critique. The racial element was consistently minimized in favor of a universal condemnation of the dangers of Rome. Implicit within this discussion is a sense that English relations with the Irish would undoubtedly improve if the latter could only acquire the godliness of their eastern neighbors. While clearly distinguishing between Protestants and Catholics on the island, he does acknowledge the "Irishness" of the Protestant inhabitants. Once again, we perceive an important distinction between ethnicity and religion – a distinction that ultimately became clouded in the subsequent history of Northern Ireland when sectarianism operated on clearly delineated "British Protestant" versus "Irish Catholic" lines.

In spite of his blanket condemnation of the Catholic religion, Rich does make claims to a strong understanding of the Irish people and indeed goes so far as to claim that he has unearthed those reasons that created "that miserable and wretched Realme of Ireland." "I have," he argues, "unmasked this brood of the generation of antichrist."[70] How, he wonders, could a country so blessed with climate and a noble history of "trade and traficke" remain so "uncivill," "uncleanly," and barbarous and more "brutish in their customes and demeanures than in any other part of the world that is knowne?"[71] Such rhetorical questions hardly require an explicit answer, yet Rich is happy to provide the reader a lengthy diatribe on the origins of the Catholic antichrist and the clear distinction between Christ and the Pope. The second portion of the book provides a rudimentary guide on how to identify the anti-Christ and thus avoid its pernicious influences.

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[69] Rich, *A Short Survey*, a2^{R}.
[70] Ibid., a3^{R}.

If Rich's *Short Survey of Ireland* underscored the universal threat Roman Catholicism poses to English stability, his second work on the Irish, *A New Description of Ireland*, exhibited a rich if extraordinarily negative understanding of the populace. By this stage, Rich had lived in Ireland for forty-seven years, spent in his "prince and countryes service." In all this time, he never purchased any land or rents, hence one can hardly depict him as a colonialist.[72] Published a year after the *Short Survey* in 1610, Rich continued his broad theme of popery in Ireland, yet once again depicts the Irish as an ignorant breed incapable of rejecting their religion: "Popery is a malady not easie to be cured, and I think these lines of mine will sooner move Choller, than give contentment, or produce amendment."[73] He laments how in his many years in the country, he observed numerous "good people, that are both capable of obedience and discipline... but alas, are still poysoned with Popery and what is he that is not touched with a kinde of compassion to see the poore and silly people so seduced and carried away by these juggling *Jesuites*?"[74] The Irish whom Rich portrays should not be feared but rather pitied. Once again, his emphasis on religion underscores a minimal ethnic distinction: "I would not have it thought, that I make any difference between the *English* and the *Irish*, in respect of their birth, for I know there be as woorthy men in *Ireland*, as any are in *England*." Moreover, as before, Rich openly distinguished between two kinds of Irish: On the one hand are those "rude, uncivill, unreverent, uncleanly and untaught," on the other are those that are "milde, modest, mercifull, kinde, curteous, and that are very way indued with wit, reason, and understanding." The former, we soon learn, characterize

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[71] Ibid., 2.
[72] Barnabie Rich, *A new description of Ireland: wherein is described the disposition of the Irish whereunto they are inclined. No lesse admirable to be perused then credible to be beleeved: neither unprofitable nor unpleasant to bee read and understood, by those worthy citizens of London that be now undertakers in Ireland* (London, 1610), Epistle, n.p.
[73] Ibid., Epistle, n.p.
[74] Ibid., Epistle, n.p. His italics.

themselves by superstitious, idolatrous, seditious and rebellious qualities; the latter "do embrace the holy Scriptures, and do indevour themselves in the service of their God, and obedience to their Prince."[75] As if to emphasize his respect for certain "elements" of the Irish populace, he claims that "I love Ireland, and that I thinke there is as neere a highway to go to Heaven from out of Ireland, as there is from any part." While it is clear that in reality only reformed Irish are close to Rich's heavenly gates, Rich clearly retains a genuine respect for *Irish* Protestants.[76]

As a text embroiled in a historiographical debate over Ireland, Rich openly condemns those former chroniclers of the island. Campion unsurprisingly receives short thrift from Rich, deeming it unnecessary to "describe the man any further, for his end made tryall of his

[75] Ibid., Epistle, n.p.
[76] My emphasis.

honesty."[77] Stanyhurst, who "patched and peeced together" a history of Ireland "do (*sic*) evermore engender ignorance." The reason behind this "ridiculous" history stems from the author's reliance on "lying Historiographers, their Chroniclers, their Bardes, their Rythmers, and such other lying Poets." All these figures, Rich contends, "do nothing but sit and compose lies."[78] Rich, in contrast, eschews such deceitful sources and provides a portrait based entirely on his own "observations." Rich's "revisionism" does indeed ignore all Irish chronicles - what remains is a truly English history of Ireland and her people, or more particularly, a Protestant history of the island. In a more specific attack on Stanyhurst's assessment of Irish religiosity, Rich argues that if they are indeed religious, such passions stem not from knowledge but mere superstition.

Rich provides a lengthy description of the positive characteristics of the Irish. He highlights their "glorious" and "proud" nature, their innate generosity. Ignorance is not an inherent trait in the Irish: "there bee some other of that Countrey birth, whose thoughts and mindes being inriched with knowledge and understanding, that have done good in the Country, and whose example hereafter, may give light to many others."[79] In his description of Dublin, Rich contradicts himself. He describes these citizens as "reformed in manners, in civility, in curtesy." One would assume he means the Protestant inhabitants of the Pale. Yet, he continues by stating that these people would in fact be irreproachable if not for their religion. Ironically, Rich has provided a positive description of well-to-do urban Catholics! Of Irish women, he focuses on "woorthy Matrones, and of those Women that are honest, good and vertuous, as

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[77] Rich, *A New Description of Ireland*, 2.
[78] Ibid., 3, 37
[79] Ibid., 17.

Ireland God bee thanked is not destitute of many such."[80] The rest of the section, however, launches into a full-scale attack on the "multitude of the rude and ignorant among the *Irish*, [who] do far passe the number either of the religious, or civilly reformed." While it is not necessary to list the various pejoratives Rich employs in his description of the Irish, it is clear that these negative characteristics of the populace are not innate:

> I do not impute this so much to their natural inclination, as I do to their education, that are trained up in Treason, in Rebellion, in Theft, in Robery, in Superstition, in Idolatry, and nuzeled from their Cradles in the very puddle of Popery.[81]

Religion and the teaching of papist practices generate such ignorant and barbarous people – ethnicity and national origin have little or no role. Rich concludes "that if these people did once understand the pretiousnesse of vertue, they would farre exceed us; notwithstanding, our long experience in the Soveraignty of vertue."[82] Protestant education could transform this population into a virtuous and superior race. One should not overlook Rich's sectarian bigotry, but one should nonetheless acknowledge that for all his faults, he was not a prototype of the Darwinian racist.

In a further rejection of innate inferiority, Rich controversially contends that their penchant for "cruelty" stems not from a natural inclination, but rather from "the mallice and hatred they bear to the English government, which they have alwaies spurned at, and are still desirous to shake off."[83] Inherent within this statement is a curious contradiction. As a loyal soldier in the English forces, Rich undoubtedly remains bemused as to why anyone would actually reject the civility and order of the English regime, but at the same time he depicts a

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[80] Ibid., 11.
[81] Rich, *A New Description*, 15.
[82] Ibid., 17.

perfectly rational reason for the Irish rebellious spirit. Without the English government, Rich argues that we should witness a further descent into lawlessness and barbarity. Yet, he concludes, "it is holden for a *Maxime* in Ireland, that ten English will sooner become Irish, than one Irish will be found to turne English."[84]

Rich's *New Description* aroused a great deal of ire among the Irish readership, so much so that Rich felt obliged to publish a defense of his work two years after the original book. *A True and a Kinde Excuse* underscores Rich's original contention that the *New Description* constituted an attack first and foremost on the papacy, not on the Irish themselves. His defense continues the themes of his first two Irish works, providing scathing attacks on the superstitions and idolatrous tenets of the Roman religion. The "jesuits and their ignorant popish priestes, under a pretense of religion, seeke nothing else but to hatch upp and to drawe in Rebellion, colouring out all their impieities, under the showe of the Catholicke faith."[85] He contends that the reasons behind the publishing of the book were "concerned nothing but a discovery of the Pope."[86] Moreover, he argues that in the *New Description*, "I have in a more ample manner inveyed agaynst Popery in generall, but not agaynst any one papist in particular."[87] Rich acknowledges that the brunt of the criticism came from well-to-do Dublin citizens who took exception to his anti-Catholic diatribes. Rich not surprisingly points out that "it was the papist indeede that pyck to manie quarrelles against [the book]." He concludes that, "they cannot

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[83] Ibid., 17.
[84] Ibid., 34.
[85] Barnabie Rich, *A True and a Kinde Excuse Written in Defence of that Booke, intitled a Newe Description of Irelande, Wherein is freely confessed the cause of the writing of that Booke, How that Booke was brought into obloquy and slander, a Revocation of all oversightes that through ignorance were published in that Booke, a Bulwarke or Defence of all truthes contayned in that Booke* (London, 1612), 4^{v}.
[86] Ibid., 4^{r}.
[87] Ibid., 5^{v}.

indure to heare their holy father so truly translated, from the *Vicar of Christ*, to bee indeed, the *Vicar of the Devil*."[88]

The second objection, he tells the reader, concerns his depiction of the Irish in general, "to bee more savage and cruell than the Canibals." Rich's defense is weak: he points out selected passages in the *New Description* which emphasize that not all the Irish are barbaric savages – what he fails to recap is his own contention that such civilized Irish represented a pitiful minority. "What have I omitted to commend in the Irish?" Rich demands of his critics, or at least he adds, "I meane of those that are worthy of any commendations indeede." What is pertinent to this discussion is Rich's clear desire to defend his work as not implicitly anti-Irish. Irrespective of his success in doing so, Rich obviously does not wish to be judged a bigot. He concludes:

> I hope there is no man that will accuse me of partiality, to say I have more forborne to speake against the follies of the English, than against the manners and customes of the Irish, or that I doe otherwise distinguish betweene them, but value them both a like, the good to the good, and the bad to the bad.[89]

In a final plea to the reader, Rich reiterates that everything he has written is an explicit condemnation of the Papacy and no more.

Rich's denial that he sought in any way to slander the greater majority highlights a "double-speak" in the writings of all the authors studied here. They see no contradiction in praising certain facets of the Irish while condemning others. A convenient solution to this supposed conundrum may lie in their clearly delineated distinction between the Irish of the "Pale" and all other "meere" Irish who lived outside the "civilized" zone. It is clear that all the

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[88] Ibid., 7^{v}.
[89] Ibid., 10^{v}.

authors retained a bias toward the Anglicized region of Ireland, yet these authors did not limit their praise to people of this area. They undoubtedly meant to describe the native Irish when commenting on their extraordinary bravery, loyalty and commitment to a cause - certainly, the "Woodkernes" of Spenser and Derricke hardly existed inside the walls of Dublin. What comes through in their writings is a guarded respect for the courage of the Irish. Ironically, even the Irish population's commitment to Catholicism engenders a begrudging degree of admiration.

It is really not until the writings of Barnabie Rich in the early seventeenth century that we witness the first explicitly sectarian criticisms of the barbarity of the Catholic Irishman. For Rich, all other facets of the populace pale in importance when compared with the need for a complete reformation on the island. Ironically, Rich contends that if the Irish could embrace wholeheartedly the tents of Protestantism, they could attain attributes equal to and even greater than those of the English themselves.

What is not explicit in Rich's or the other writers' critiques is a claim that the Irish are indeed racially inferior to the English.[90] Obsession with rebellion, disloyalty to the crown and a commitment to the papal anti-Christ all have explainable causes. Hatred of the English and a love of superstitious practices are by no means insignificant characteristics in the eyes of the writers, but nonetheless, these are attributes acquired through "deficient" education and isolation from the "civilized" world - what they are not are innate qualities. Popish priests have "poysoned" the Irish. Indeed, for the writers to admit that such negative attributes are natural to the Irish would beg the question, why then would the English seek to reform and "civilize" the population? They did so because of a strong belief that Irish manners could indeed be

transformed through the processes of a superior form of government and most certainly through the ministries of a godly clergy. Ultimately, as Noonan convincingly argues, this emphasis on religion in distinguishing the Irish from the English becomes less prevalent by the mid-seventeenth century. In the aftermath of the 1641 Rebellion, and in particular the publication of John Temple's treatise on the uprising in 1646, English perceptions of the Irish began to focus as much on their ethnicity as their religion.[91]

The writers of Elizabethan and early Jacobean England had not yet perceived the Irish as a cruel race. Even the cruelty Rich attributes to the Irish stems more from the barbarism of the pernicious priests than any ethnic characteristic of the Irish themselves. The paranoia that existed in the wake of the 1641 rebellion led to extraordinary accusations lacking in the works of the authors under study here. Bigoted and cruel these English writers most certainly were, but amid this unsympathetic tone lay another characteristic - a strong belief in the excellence of English political, social and theological traditions - qualities which could relieve the Irish of their untold miseries.

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[90] Admittedly, one could deem the term "racially inferior" as anachronistic - this paper does not pursue the relative meaning of the term in Elizabethan England. What is meant for the purposes of this essay centers on the innate inferiority of an ethnic group.
[91] Noonan, "'The Cruell Pressure," 151-177.

Was de Gaulle a European?
Nation and Supranation Following World War II

By Lucien-Pierre Bouchard

> "It is not impossible, of course, to imagine that all the peoples of our continent will some day be one..., but it would be ridiculous to act as though that day had come."
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> — Charles de Gaulle, Speech of July 23, 1964.
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> "In his haughty nationalism, de Gaulle is Tristan. France is his Isolde..."
>
> — Denis de Rougemont, *Preuves*, May 1961, p. 34.

What were General de Gaulle's intentions regarding the construction of Europe? Should he be considered one of the promoters of a united Europe, or, as some think, did he contribute to a dramatic decline in this plan? De Gaulle's role in post-war efforts at continental organization is the subject of intense controversy even today.

And for good reason, as De Gaulle's conception of Europe was undoubtedly the least clearly delineated aspect of his thinking. At times he called for the "federation" of the peoples of Europe, at others for their "confederation"; at still others, he advocated the nation, its sovereignty, its "grandeur," and France's "influence" and "mission" in the world. In fact, de Gaulle's management of the European question is somewhat surprising for historians: stratagem and candor, enthusiasm and pessimism, pragmatism and idealism, hesitation and decision are merely a partial list of his apparent contradictions.

However, one should not forget the extremely uncertain conditions in which de Gaulle's views on European politics developed. First of all one can well imagine how difficult it was in the midst of war to contemplate the order of a liberated Europe. What to do about Germany? And even more important for de Gaulle, what would be the status of France, a country conquered by

the Nazis and liberated by the Allies? These questions and, more immediately, those raised by a war that had not yet been won, made it impossible to develop a clear conception of the political and economic forms that Europe might take in the post-war period.

In addition, conditions remained eminently complex once peace had been restored. Being exhausted, busy counting their dead and rebuilding from their ruins, the various peoples of Europe did not have the same priorities. The ravaged and disturbed European nations maintained complicated and, at times even mistrustful relations; not to mention the massive diplomatic interventions by the Russians and Americans. De Gaulle's at times paradoxical treatment of the European question must be viewed in light of these circumstances.

For some de Gaulle's views are all the more excusable since, in addition to the difficult historical conditions, there was the "novelty" of the concept of Europe, which "even in de Gaulle's lifetime, gave rise to numerous variations, indeed even conflicting positions, both in France and its European partners."[1] However, while it is true that European leaders for the first time displayed a genuine political will in favor of continental organization, believing that de Gaulle was unfamiliar with the history of this argument would be to underestimate the man, because this is in fact a very old story, which we will now consider very briefly before looking more closely at de Gaulle's role in it.

I. A Brief History of Europe

The idea of a single Europe dates back several centuries. It was fairly clearly explained in the seventeenth century by Henri IV's minister Sully, and in the eighteenth century by l'Abbé de Saint-Pierre. At the time, wanting to unify Europe meant embracing an eminently universal idea,

that of structuring humanity in political terms because, as political analyst Charles Zorgbibe so clearly states, "Europe at that time was the known world, or at least the 'useful' world."[2] Consequently it cannot be said that a genuine European sentiment was beginning to emerge, but rather that there were broader global intentions, the motivations of which were essentially geopolitical, because the first purpose of a "Single Europe" was apparently to secure peace and concord in the Christian world.

Condorcet, Benjamin Constant, Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, Proudhon, Victor Hugo and many others subsequently developed the idea beyond the mere imperative of common security and defense. In the nineteenth century there arose the concept of a properly European regionalism. While vaguely felt at first, this concept soon brought calls for greater cooperation among the continent's nations.

The European Directory was the first systematic attempt at continental organization based on diplomacy rather than arms, and was instituted after the Napoleonic wars by the victorious powers (England, Austria, Prussia and Russia) for three closely related reasons: to control France, to suppress all revolutionary movements in Europe, and to guarantee the peace and territorial integrity of every state. In 1823, following the admission of France, which had restored its monarchy, the Directory became the Concert of Europe, which, through numerous diplomatic conferences, helped solve numerous international issues peacefully until 1914. However, the First World War marked its end.

Following the war, the idea of a union of European countries within a formal institutional structure came increasingly to the fore. The term "integration" appeared in the vocabulary of the

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[1] Pierre Maillard, *De Gaulle et l'Europe* (Paris: Tallandier, 1995), p. 10.

[2] Charles Zorgbibe, *Histoire de la construction européenne* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), p. 1.

political class. Other events included the publication of the European Manifest by Count Koudenhove-Kalergi in 1924[3] and the famous 1929 address to the Society of Nations by France's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briant. Briant stated that, "between peoples that are grouped together geographically, ... there must exist a kind of federal link", which however "must not affect the sovereignty of any of the nations which might belong to such an association."

Despite evermore explicit unionist talk, no specifically European institutions emerged. European politics at the time was characterised much more by deep divisions than by the vague integrationist impulses of a certain political and intellectual class. The continent then ignited once again, this time racked by the Second World War.

It was only through the experience of the war that Europeans began seriously to consider introducing pan-European decision-making structures. There were ultimately two reasons for this concern. The first was to be done with the warring excesses of militant nationalism and thus to ward off its apocalyptic possibilities. The second was to arm the continent against the messianic ambitions of communism as a counterweight to the East Bloc countries.

Work on a new Europe genuinely got under way at the Hague Conference in 1948, which resulted in the creation of the European Council, an organization responsible for promoting cooperation among the member states.[4] The Council, a forerunner institution, could only make recommendations, which thus limited its influence on the unification process.

It was not until 1950 that Europe took a decisive step. Drawing on the ideas of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, then France's Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed to create an

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[3]De Gaulle then had an interesting correspondence with Koudenhove-Kalergi, whose idea of Europe was reminiscent of the Holly Roman Empire at the time of Otto, before it was virtually germanized by the Hapsburgs.

[4]It is interesting to note that the Hague Conference was a private initiative. In December 1947, the International Coordinating Committee for a United Europe (ICCUE), a non-governmental organization, organized the Congress, which was attended by more than 800 public figures from 19 countries, including 16 former heads of government

organization with independent powers in the steel and coal industry. The Schuman Declaration led to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which set an international political precedent. ECSC was not merely an institution for cooperation, but also for governing in concert through a body to which the various states had delegated powers that were traditionally their own.

Of course, the ECSC concerned only a single industry, but at the time it was the only compromise acceptable to all partners. However, the particular feature of the ECSC was that in establishing it, its members tacitly agreed to build Europe on a piece-by-piece basis, one industry after another, with the ultimate goal being political union, the terms of which remained to be determined.

From this moment on, progress toward a political Europe was virtually stalled by two major setbacks. The first was the French government's rejection in 1954 of the plan for the European Defence Community (EDC). This was followed by the failure in 1962 of the Fouchet Plan which, at General de Gaulle's initiative, was intended to provide a structure for and introduce political cooperation among the states.

The political construction of Europe remained at a dead end until the Paris Summit in 1972, where the idea was revived and put on the agenda. On the basis of the considerable progress made toward economic integration (cf. the Rome Treaty in 1957), the participants undertook at Paris to bring together the conditions for a political union. But once again, the members were not in a hurry, and the discussions begun in Paris were constantly put off from summit to summit and from conference to conference.

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and more than 20 acting ministers. This private intervention, a historical curiosity, resulted in the establishment of an international public law organization.

When solemnly reaffirmed more than ten years later at the Stuttgart Summit in 1982, the plan for political union ultimately resulted in the Spinelli Plan, which was ratified by the European Parliament in 1984. However, the Parliament's proposals were deemed unacceptable to the majority of governments, which once again were in no hurry to advance them. As usual, economics was the most frequent focus of discussion until the Single Act of 1986, in which the members implemented the longstanding Single Market plan.[5]

It was not until 1992 that the member states actually carried out the first diplomatic step toward continental political unification: the Treaty on the European Union (TUE) also known as the "Maastricht Treaty".

II. Reference Point: The Nation

As will be seen, de Gaulle never wanted a supranational Europe. At most he wanted an international continent built on cooperation among states. Why? Strategic and geopolitical contingencies were undoubtedly a very important factor in this choice, but, for the real answer, we must first of all look into de Gaulle's political philosophy.

1. Civic Nation and Ethnic Nation

Marked early on by his reading of Barrès, de Gaulle had an idea of the nation that, despite what has been said of it, drew on both French and Germanic sources. In France, in the Enlightenment tradition, the revolutionaries of 1789 based the idea of the nation on the union of individual wills, on freely chosen membership in a social contract. Siéyès defined the national

[5] Note that, from the moment it was ratified, the Single Act became the subject of intense controversy over its actual scope. Many thought it did not advance the integrationist cause as far as it appeared to do. See Jacques Nemrod, *Le mal européen : le trompe-l'oeil de l'Acte Unique* (Marseille: Rivages/Les Échos, 1988).

community as "a body of partners living under a common law".[6] Later on, Renan best expressed this republican and civic conception of the nation. Strongly influenced by Kant, Renan held that the nation was founded on two things, the one past, the other present. The nation is definitely a matter of memory, that is to say "the common possession of a rich heritage of memories," but it is especially "present consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to carry on the heritage we have received together."[7] While the cult of ancestors is a perfectly legitimate basis, the nation is above all "an everyday plebiscite,"[8] the result of a constantly renewed contract between the individuals who make it up. Being built by them, it is therefore not eternal: as Renan said, nations "had a beginning, and they will have an end."[9]

In the wake of Herder and German romanticism, a diametrically opposite theory developed in Germany. In his *Speech to the German Nation*, Fichte linked the concept of nation to the ethnic factor and attributed a spiritual dimension to nationalism. The integrating principle of life together was first of all blood, soil and common origins. This was the nation as nation-race, the *Urvolk*. Contrary to the individualism and constructivism of the Enlightenment, romanticism offered a holistic and naturalistic vision of the national community. This was not the result of a contract. The community had its own eternal soul, whose existence was independent of individual wills. Without it, the individual is nothing, while the nation, an imperishable subject of history, can easily go on without the individual. It is a first principle, the origins of which are lost to memory, and it commands unconditional devotion. No one can escape his blood, race and roots.

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[6] Cited in Jean Touchard, *Histoire des idées politiques*, tome 2 : *Du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), p. 459.

[7] Ernest Renau, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? Et autres essais politiques*, selected and presented by Joël Roman, (Paris: Presses Pocket, 1992), p. 54. Our emphasis.

[8] Ibid., p. 55.

[9] Ibid.

2. At the Confluence of Two Traditions

Fichte was of course a major inspiration to Barrès,[10] who, together with Péguy, was one of de Gaulle's intellectual guides. There can be no doubt that de Gaulle assimilated aspects of German thought through Barrès, but it would probably be an exaggeration to conclude, as does Jean-Baptise Neveux, that in de Gaulle, "there were... many more traits borrowed from the German form of thinking which underlies Germanicism... than elements borrowed from the traditional political thinking of those who built France."[11] Of course, one sees in de Gaulle a number of things that coincide with German romantic thought. His idea of a France "which has existed from time immemorial," an "eternal France whose "grandeur" is linked to the world by "a 2,000-year-old pact,"[12] undeniably suggests this. His call for national transcendence and his constant references to "founders" such as the Gauls, Clovis, Charlemagne and Joan of Arc, also reveal a mythical conception of a homogeneous France.

However, while it is true that de Gaulle had a holistic idea of the French people, and that the nation, in his mind, at times had an ethnic and territorial component, it would be unfair and reductionist to see this as the last word on his ideas because the cult of the nation never made de Gaulle forget the fundamental traits of French republican thinking. De Gaulle's unshakeable attachment to democracy and its values - tolerance, liberty and law - is well known.[13] And while France was always his greatest concern, he never forgot the recognition due to other peoples, that is to say the necessity of "granting them ... what he claimed for his own, ... respect for their

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[10] "... the clearest aspect of the Barrès doctrine ... is German political romanticism." Charles Andler, *Vie de Lucien Herr, 1864-1926* (Paris: Maspero, 1977), pp. 153-154.

[11] Jean-Baptiste Neveux, "Charles de Gaulle et la pensée allemande", in *Études gaulliennes*, numéro 17, février-mars 1977, p. 17. Cited in Pierre Maillard, op. cit., p. 27.

[12] Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages, 1940-1946* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1946), p. 52.

specific nature and [their] right to independence."[14] The Algerian war, moreover, demonstrated this quite clearly.

To consider France and *Urvolk* as being vaguely on the same footing would be to underestimate Gaullism. A finer analysis would place de Gaulle at the crossroads of the French-civic and German-ethnic traditions. Being an ardent nationalist, he wanted a strong and proud nation, and, being an ardent democrat, he wanted it open and respectful. While the Gaullist conception objectified the eternal myth of the nation, it also released it from the narrowly biological meaning generally attached to it by the tradition of Fichte, and established it rather as a historical cultural community, naturally sovereign and having its own international personality.

This profoundly nationalist credo underlies de Gaulle's vision of the world and, in most instances, his plan for Europe. For de Gaulle, the state, as an agent of the nation, must be the inevitable unit of international relations.[15] It must be strong and remain independent in order to carry out its mission, which was first and foremost to secure the conditions of the nation's development.

We should note here the importance of the concept of independence, a corollary of the General's ideas on the nation. According to Pierre Maillard, independence is even "the key word in his thinking." He applied it to persons ("he displayed it himself in his constant rebellion against conventional thinking"[16]), and he demanded it for France. As will be seen below, he also demanded it for Europe.

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[13] See in particular the Oxford speech of November 25, 1941 in Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages*, op. cit., p. 138.

[14] Pierre Maillard, op. cit., p. 30.

[15] Note here the great affinity with the realist trend in international relations, one of the best known theoreticians of which, Raymond Aron, was extensively read by de Gaulle.

III. Europe and the de Gaulle Years

With the war and the alliances it required, de Gaulle realised the necessity of organizing Europe. Between his exile in London and his presidency of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle's views obviously had time to change, but, unlike those who point to paradoxes and ambiguities in his thought, one should suggest instead that there was an evolution. This paper will illustrate the belief that de Gaulle remained faithful to the principles of his political philosophy and constantly strove, with a considerable degree of coherence, to reconcile them with the vagaries and demands of international events. This may be seen by viewing events chronologically.

1. During the War

As Under Secretary of State for War in the Reynaud government, de Gaulle went to London in mid-June 1940 at the very moment Jean Monnet and Sir Robert Vansittart submitted an extensive plan for Franco-British union to the British Parliament. De Gaulle's reaction to the program as presented was lukewarm, but he nevertheless supported it energetically before Churchill, who, although quite reluctant, ultimately allowed himself to be convinced. On June 16, the British government offered France union on the following terms:

> ... France and Great Britain shall henceforth no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union. The Union shall institute common organizations for defence, foreign policy, finance and the economy. Every French citizen shall immediately enjoy the status of citizen of Great Britain and every British citizen shall become a citizen of France. ... During the war, there shall be only one war cabinet and all the forces of Great Britain and France ... shall be placed under its direction. The two parliaments shall be formally associated.[17]

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[16] Pierre Maillard, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
[17] See Pierre Gerbet, *La construction de l'Europe* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1997), p. 42.

De Gaulle telephoned Paul Reynaud that same day to inform him of the British offer, but he was too late: Reynaud had just handed over power to Pétain, who had accepted the armistice.

That de Gaulle agreed to support the offer was quite surprising. The union it proposed profoundly undermined the sovereignty and independence of the parties, and it is difficult to understand how de Gaulle's nationalist approach could be reconcilable with this breach of the nation's monopoly on the kingly functions of the state.

However, as the war progressed, de Gaulle became considerably more circumspect in his "unifying" intentions. This may be seen from his declarations, which, from that point on, focused on general matters. In a speech at Albert Hall on November 11, 1942, de Gaulle said: "France wishes to make every effort so that, in Europe, all those whose interests, defense and development needs are joined to its own will unite with it, and it with them, in a practical and lasting way."[18] On March 18, 1944, he informed the Advisory Assembly of Algiers:

> For the old continent, once renewed, to find a balance… we feel that certain organizations of nations will have to be developed within it, without of course undermining the sovereignty of each member. As regards France, we believe that a kind of Western organization, developed with us, mainly on an economic basis… could offer considerable benefits. ... The French government is now prepared to begin, ... together with other interested states, all the necessary studies and negotiations to achieve this end.[19]

All these proposals were submitted in rather vague terms: in fact, the only point that was explained in this speech was the inalienable nature of national sovereignty. At the time, de Gaulle had thus drastically distanced himself from the British plan of June 1940. In fact, the traditional ideas of the leader of free France are much more recognisable in his Algiers speech.

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[18] Charles de Gaulle, *Discours et messages*, op. cit., p. 258.

[19] Ibid., pp. 420-421. Here de Gaulle is expressing the position of the Comité Français de Libération Nationale (CFLN).

Similarly, de Gaulle resolutely distanced himself here in the Algiers speech from the vague unionist impulses of the exiled governments of the occupied countries. Starting in 1942, some of those countries, in particular Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland, raised the possibility a number of times of a federal organization of liberated European nations. While this idea obviously appealed to Jean Monnet, who felt there could be no "peace in Europe if the states re-established themselves on the basis of national sovereignty,"[20] it held no allure for de Gaulle, whose priority was to restore grandeur and prestige to France.

How then to explain his consent in 1940 for a plan under which Great Britain and France would virtually have merged? De Gaulle's consent is doubly surprising because, not only did the pact in question limit the sovereignty of the parties, it also meant that British authorities would in actual fact become the guardians of a routed France. De Gaulle was not unaware that, under the plan, his country would give up both sovereignty and independence.

But de Gaulle was a pragmatist. France was in trouble and had to seize the hand that was extended to it. In addition, Churchill's offer might have convinced the Reynaud government to continue the fight and to resist the supporters of armistice. But time was of the essence: the influence of Pétain and Weygand was increasing daily, and it was therefore impossible to review the terms of the plan. It must be understood then that de Gaulle acquiesced to the plan even though he profoundly - and perhaps even completely - disagreed with it, and solely in view of his country's immediate situation. Starting in late 1944, when, with considerable lucidity, he considered the war as "ultimately won,"[21] de Gaulle returned to a much more nationalistic vision of European politics.[22]

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[20] In a memo sent to the CFLN on August 5, 1943. Cited in Pierre Gerbet, p. 46.
[21] Cited by Colonel Passy in his *Mémoires*. See Pierre Maillard, p. 106.
[22] This was also the case for Churchill, who, in the spring of 1945, withdrew the offer made to France.

Like most of his contemporaries, de Gaulle obviously foresaw the need to organise Europe politically once peace had been restored. The speeches cited above prove this beyond any doubt. However, it is unlikely that de Gaulle had an authentic "concept of European" at that time, that is to say political designs that were rooted in a genuinely European regional consciousness. Unlike Pierre Maillard, we do not believe that de Gaulle's Algiers and Albert Hall speeches provide a valid basis for thinking that de Gaulle had "a broad and clear vision"[23] of the future in this regard. The General's European intentions were intimately related to the circumstances of the war, and, while he anticipated preferential relations with France's European partners in the post-war period, those relations did not go beyond the classic model of co-operation and diplomacy between states.

It was not until later that de Gaulle thought of Europe "for Europe's sake," that is to say, without always considering it in relation to geopolitical circumstances.

2. De Gaulle's Opposition to the Fourth Republic

In January 1946, following the failure of his proposed constitution, de Gaulle left the head of the provisional government, but remained very active politically and founded the Rassemblement du peuple français (RPF). His positions against the nascent Europe were numerous and vehement.

It should be noted that de Gaulle did not belong to the pro-Europe circles at this time, and even remained far removed from them. Although he corresponded quite regularly with Koudenhove-Kalergi, he had no known contact with the International Coordinating Committee for a United Europe, or with any of the organisations it spearheaded. Nor did he attend the Hague

[23] Maillard, p. 97.

Convention (1948), to which he was not even invited. In fact, under the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle's speeches on European construction turned essentially on two themes: the Soviet threat and the plan for the European Defence Community (EDC).

a) Soviet Imperialism

As the war raged on, de Gaulle was already concerned about the power of the Anglo-American bloc. Often pushed to the sidelines by Roosevelt and Churchill, de Gaulle signed with Stalin the "*Belle et Bonne Alliance*" (1944) which he hoped would increase France's flexibility in dealing with the Anglo-Saxons. However, the pact soon revealed its limits: Stalin did nothing to ensure the French were present at Yalta or Potsdam, and the USSR soon displayed an imperialist attitude towards Eastern Europe that was contrary to the spirit of the agreement.

De Gaulle was bitter. And like all Western governments at this time, he became very much concerned about "the Stalinist policy of aggression." After considering the USSR as essential to the continental balance, he now viewed it as the cause of a very grave imbalance that absolutely had to be corrected:

> To the grave outside dangers that threaten Europe, the world and us as a result of Soviet Russia's unlimited ambition to dominate, and nothing else, we have a solution called the *European Federation* in the areas of the economy and defence.[24]

How could de Gaulle, the defender of national sovereignty and independence, evoke the image of a federation of European countries? The ambiguity in his choice of words would undoubtedly never be corrected, but it seems reasonable to believe that what the General had in mind was, at most, the idea of a confederation. Whatever the case may be, his speech here clearly stands, at

[24] In a note to the RPF dated July 19, 1948. Cited in Maillard, pp. 106-107. Our emphasis.

least in principle, against the nationalistic positions of its author. Why? We would say for the same reasons that led de Gaulle to accept Churchill's offer in 1940. Once again, de Gaulle was acting out of pragmatism. Faced with this outside threat, he adopted positions that he would normally have rejected. This is not contradictory, but rather a lucid and energetic decision by a man who had a clear conception that France's sovereignty, left alone before the massive power of the Soviet Union, risked much more than it would within an organization of European nations, no matter how integrated it might be. Moreover, it was in this spirit that de Gaulle agreed to the creation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949. However, he vehemently denounced the plan for a common European defense system a few years later.

b) The EDC Plan

In 1950, Schuman introduced his plan, which would ultimately result in the ECSC. De Gaulle opposed the plan, denouncing its essentially economic nature. In his view, this agreement concerning the "muddled business" of steel and coal could not come before a political agreement. He was concerned that the ground rules would not be politically determined at the outset. For Gaullists, politics, as a form of expression of national sovereignty, must come before economics. Not to mention the fact that, from a nationalist standpoint, the ECSC was much too supranational in appearance.[25]

And if supranationalism was clearly a disturbing development in the field of coal and steel, it was simply unacceptable in the area of defence. For Jean Monnet, the plan was perfectly

[25] According to a simple definition of supranationalism, its supporters seek to reproduce the conventional concept of nation state on a continental scale. See Lucien-Pierre Bouchard, "Les Quinze à la croisée des chemins", in *Études internationales*, Québec, IQHEI, Volume XXVII, No. 3, September 1996.

legitimate because federal Europe "cannot be limited to coal and steel,"[26] but de Gaulle fiercely opposed the EDC and fought it every step of the way.

The purpose of the EDC was twofold: first, to provide a structure for the rearmament of Germany and, second, to continue the federal integration of Europe. Those behind the plan felt that a European army was the safest way to establish genuine solidarity among the partners of the new European Community. But de Gaulle did not see matters this way.

In his view, an army was the primary tool of national independence. As a military man and a nationalist, de Gaulle could not accept any weakening of France's control over its own troops. He flared up against what he called "the stateless mix." As he said in January 1954, "I guarantee there will be no European army! I will do everything in my power to oppose it. I will work with the Communists to block it. I will start a revolution against it."[27] Defense was the very symbol of national sovereignty, the last bastion of the people, and its command should never be shared. "A so-called 'European' army," he said, "threatens to put an end *de jure* to France's sovereignty."[28]

In addition, in de Gaulle's view, the concept of continental defense was a contradiction in terms. An army had no purpose apart from defending the homeland, but Europe was not a homeland, nor even an economic or political entity. The idea of the EDC was thus absolutely illegitimate in his eyes, a "fallacious" and "artificial" plan, a "fraud" and a "sham."

But there was another, more immediate reason why de Gaulle rejected the idea of an integrated continental army. He suspected France's European partners (in particular West Germany and the Netherlands), who were very much aligned with Washington, of wanting to

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[26] Cited in Pierre Gerbet, p. 137.
[27] Cited in Ernst Weisenfeld, *Quelle Allemagne pour la France?* (Paris: Armand Collin, 1989), p. 63.
[28] Cited in Jean Monnet, *Mémoires* (Paris: Fayard, 1976), p. 429.

organize a much more Atlantic than European form of defence. In a word, the General feared the EDC might serve as an alibi for "pro-American zealots" in promoting even more massive intervention by the United States in the continent's defence. In a letter of October 1955 to Koudenhove-Kalergi, he wrote that the EDC agreement "cannot go through Washington, which... no one in Bonn or Paris has realized..."[29] because the military would certainly then be handed over to the "great American leader."[30]

In short, not only would the EDC confiscate France's army, it would also hand over command to a group of Atlantic powers whose decision-making centre would very likely be located on another continent, which was obviously an intolerable prospect for de Gaulle who had always wanted a strong and sovereign France in an independent Europe.

This requirement of autonomy would also be the touchstone of de Gaulle's efforts at European construction. As will be seen below, it was because of this that de Gaulle would pit the Paris-Bonn axis against the London-Washington axis once he returned to power.

3. De Gaulle's Initiatives

De Gaulle immediately began contributing to the start-up of the Common Market as soon as he returned to power in 1958, implementing a range of measures - fiscal and monetary arrangements and trade liberalization - to ensure the success of the Rome Treaty. It will be remembered that he had opposed the ECSC, but were these actions a reversal of his position? Analysis shows that, on the contrary, de Gaulle was once again acting in a very rigorous and realistic way. In his view, the idea was to pit the Common Market against the single free trade area that Great Britain was proposing at the time.

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[29] Charles de Gaulle, *Lettres, notes et carnets*, Volume 7 (Paris: Plon, 1984), p. 255.

He also had to face the realities of power and deal with considerable integrationist forces. Opinion quickly evolved in France and the idea of the construction of Europe - at least of a certain type of Europe - was increasingly coming to the fore. Developments in this area seemed inevitable and de Gaulle was aware of this. Furthermore, while he opposed the Europe of his predecessors in no uncertain terms, it is not clear that he himself was anti-Europe. He simply demanded conditions for a united Europe that he was now in a position to set. President de Gaulle's European initiative was marked by two outstanding moments: the meeting with Chancellor Adenauer at Colombey-les-Deux-Églises and the development of the Fouchet Plan.

a) Meeting at Colombey-les-Deux-Églises

During the war, despite all the traditional differences between France and Great Britain, de Gaulle had contemplated a continental organization based on the Paris-London axis. While the matter had appeared quite straightforward at that point, this was no longer the case in 1958. The English had established closer ties with the Americans and were advocating an essentially Atlantic policy. De Gaulle therefore had to look for another solution.

The solution was the RFA. Being solidly democratic and permanently back in the concert of nations, Germany, in the General's mind, no longer represented the threat it had posed ten years earlier. His mistrust had given way to a desire for close collaboration; West Germany now had to be considered a full-fledged partner of France, even its friend.

President de Gaulle now viewed Europe from the standpoint of the Franco-German axis. But it is not certain this idea was new to him. In 1943, he had answered Otto de Habsburg, who advocated the dismantling of Germany that the sole hope for "rest and well-being" for Europe

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[30] Cited in Monnet,, p. 429.

was "a revision of the Treaty of Verdun and the reunification of the Franks of the West and East."[31] And in 1949, he said he was "dazzled by the prospect of what Germany and France could do together."[32]

It was in this spirit that he invited Chancellor Adenauer to his property at Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, a personal and friendly invitation that was not subsequently repeated in de Gaulle's relations with his foreign counterparts. He offered Konrad Adenauer a preferential cooperative arrangement, which was to serve as a springboard to the construction of Europe. But what Europe did this mean? De Gaulle was very clear on this: "... One must not confuse the respective policies of two countries, as the theoreticians of the ECSC ... and the European Defense Community claimed to do, but, on the contrary, recognise that the situations are very different, and build on that situation."[33] In short, Europe must not limit the sovereignty and identity of its members.

De Gaulle set two other conditions. First, he insisted that any potential European union must be independent of the United States. Adenauer, the head of a divided country threatened by the Soviets, was still very attached to the idea of American protection. De Gaulle understood the Chancellor's concern and reaffirmed France's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, but remained firm on the principle of a European, not Atlantic Europe. His second condition, that Great Britain be excluded, was a corollary of the first. Since England was, in the General's view, nothing more than a political and economic satellite of the United States, admitting it to the community would be tantamount to letting in an American Trojan horse. Although in favor of including Britain, Adenauer was nevertheless persuaded by his counterpart's argument.

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[31] Cited in Maillard, p. 99. Ratified in 843 and putting an end to the Western Roman Empire, the Treaty of Verdun marked the start of the historically antagonistic relations between France and Germany.

[32] Cited in Pierre Gerbet, p. 95.

However, there may have been another motivation behind his desire to exclude the English. In addition to his requirement of independence, there was probably also a desire to ensure that France held the leadership of the new Europe. Germany was divided and had been defeated, and, even though it was recovering quickly, its relative weight was considerably diminished. It in fact appeared that de Gaulle viewed Europe as a means of extending France's influence throughout the world. The membership of a great power such as Great Britain would obviously reduce France's influence in the new organization proportionately.

Regardless of the differences it revealed, the Colombey meeting proved to be a definite success. Adenauer found that de Gaulle was more pro-Europe than he had hoped and thus accepted the essential parts of his arguments, although with some reservations. President and Chancellor agreed on three points: first, a political Europe must be built; second, its main support would be the Paris-Bonn axis; third, it must never undermine the essential aspects of national sovereignties. The Fouchet Plan would then be based on these parameters.

b) The Fouchet Plan

The founding fathers of Europe, with Monnet and Schuman at the forefront, aimed for a federal and supranational Europe. They suggested achieving this objective gradually through economic integration, which would ultimately bring the political component in its wake. This was the spillover strategy; with a combination of hard sell and soft sell, wherein the political would follow the economic. However, the leaders of the Fifth Republic under de Gaulle did not view the matter in this way. They pitted a state-based, national and confederal Europe against a supranational and federal Europe. In arguing against the mechanism and function of the spillover

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[33] Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, tome 1: *Le renouveau, 1958-1962* (Paris: Plon, 1970), p. 186.

strategy, they contended that political voluntarism was required. De Gaulle himself had nothing but recriminations for the supranationalists, accusing them of confusing "exaggerated and chimerical myths" with "common sense and reality." In the General's mind, he was dealing with "cranks" and "shipwreckers of the nation" who would substitute a "stateless and irresponsible technocratic assembly" for national governments, "the only entities with the right to order and the power to be obeyed."[34]

In the wake of the Colombey meeting, de Gaulle decided to take the initiative in the matter of the construction of Europe, which to that time had been monopolized by the supranationalists. Apparently for the first time, de Gaulle's unionist intentions were no longer simply a matter of circumstance, essentially linked to "common threats." Starting in 1960, Europe, in de Gaulle's mind, was no longer a purely pragmatic choice, or what one might call a lesser evil. Immediately after Colombey, de Gaulle conceived of a Europe for Europe, in accordance with a genuinely European concept. He wrote that he now more than ever felt

> ...what the nations that people it have in common. Since they all are of white race and Christian origins, have the same way of life, have been bound together forever through innumerable relationships in thought, art, science, politics and trade, it is consistent with their nature that they should form, in the middle of the world, an entity with its own character and organization.[35]

But de Gaulle's new "European consciousness" did not undermine his nationalist conviction: in the same breath, he added that he also thought that "European union cannot be a merger of European peoples, but must result from their systematic rapprochement."[36]

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[34] Cited in Charles Zorgbibe, p. 51.
[35] de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, p. 181.
[36] Ibidem.

It was in this "European" spirit that, in July 1960, President de Gaulle organized the Rambouillet meeting, which paved the way to the Paris Summit in February 1961. Five months later, the Bonn Conference resulted in the "Godesberg Declaration," in which the six signatory countries officially and unanimously decided to enter into a political union. But according to what principles? An Intergovernmental Study Commission under the chairmanship of Christian Fouchet was established to consider this question.

In October 1961 the Commission submitted the French plan to the member countries. This was the Fouchet Plan, two versions of which were successively negotiated before the General himself submitted a third in January 1962. De Gaulle proposed a confederation based on two main motivations: to collaborate closely in the fields of science, technology, culture, human rights and democracy, and to shape a common foreign policy and defence policy. In more concrete terms, the Fouchet Plan called for the creation of three major bodies: a parliament, a council and a political commission. The parliament would have an exclusively deliberative role, the political commission would be an advisory organization composed of officials from the member states, and the council would be the sole decision-making body. The council would periodically bring together the heads of government and reach its decisions unanimously. Each state would have the choice of voting for, against or abstaining. Confederal decisions would be binding only in countries that had voted in favor of them.

However, the negotiating marathon over the Fouchet Plan resulted in a resounding failure. The model it proposed - a Europe of states - was too radically different from the federal and supranational conception the Benelux countries had defended. In addition, those countries were irritated by France's refusal to eventually admit Great Britain. In April 1962 the break occurred and the Fouchet Plan was aborted.

Under analysis, the Belgian and Dutch positions seemed somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, they called for the creation of a supranational organization, while on the other, they advocated membership for England, whose nationalist positions were much closer to those of France. In addition, the Belgians and Dutch did not realise that adopting the Fouchet Plan, even if it did not respond to supranationalism, would nevertheless represent a first step toward a political Europe. On the contrary, its rejection meant the end of talks on integration, which would not seriously resume until the 1980s. The result was thus paradoxical: in the 1960s it was the supporters of a "greater Europe" who were responsible for its decline, which would not be reversed for another twenty years.

De Gaulle was sorely disappointed and broke off his unionist action. He doubted his partners' motivations and accused them of wanting to establish a union on conditions that were unacceptable to France. He no longer believed in a political Europe. The "empty chair policy," which he exercised in Brussels in 1965 and the "Luxembourg Compromise," which resulted in 1966 moreover confirmed this cooler attitude.[37] President de Gaulle's main concerns would henceforth be the role and specific nature of his country in the world. His foreign policy attests to this: between 1963 and 1966, France left NATO, forged independent relations with communist China, drew closer to Moscow and decided unilaterally on a new policy concerning the Third World.[38] France alone would carry out the mission it had set for itself in the world, which was to defend the right of nations to independence.[39]

For the rest of his presidency, de Gaulle remained indifferent to all attempts to revive plans for a political Europe. He summed up his thinking on the subject at his press conference on

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[37] As is known, these episodes marked profound decline in community powers.
[38] See the Phnom Penh speech.
[39] As witness, among other things, the "Vive le Québec libre!" incident in Montreal (Canada).

July 23, 1964: "... France... is pursuing, by its own means, what a European and independent policy can and should be. The fact is that peoples everywhere are pleased with this, and France is no worse off."

Europe as a political construct was dead, and would remain so until Maastricht in 1992.

IV. A Historic Role

De Gaulle was not one of the precursors of the idea of Europe. At the same time, other political leaders embraced the project with considerably more fervour than he. And this was because the General remained attached to France, to its past, to its independence and its specific nature. The homeland, in his mind, embodied an irreducible and impassable myth, and the individual should strive to reflect its glory. De Gaulle's entire life is moreover an exceptional example of this dedication. One feels that all of de Gaulle's reluctance with regard to Europe is rooted above all in this philosophy of the nation, which we see as standing at the confluence of the German and French traditions.

De Gaulle thus remained profoundly nationalistic, but that did not prevent him from opening up to the developments of his times, which he himself characterised at the time as "massive exchanges, boundless common undertakings in science and technology, rapid communication, extensive travel."[40] From 1940 to 1958, although he was considering continental unification from a purely circumstantial and pragmatic standpoint, he clearly realized, once he returned to power, that the "concept of Europe" now had a universally recognized legitimacy. It was shortly after the Colombey meeting with Adenauer that de Gaulle foresaw a European organization of countries for himself, regardless of the threats that weighed on France.

Ultimately, General de Gaulle was not a European, but he became one. But the European he became was not without restrictions: "[Europe] must be genuinely European," he said. "If it is not a Europe of the peoples... it will be... limited and have no future. And the Americans will take advantage of the situation to impose their hegemony. Europe must be independent."[41] A Europe of the states, an independent Europe - these were the only conditions on which de Gaulle would accept the idea of continental unification. Of course, these stipulations excluded the federal and supranational intentions of the founding fathers. However, de Gaulle nevertheless wanted union. He simply wanted it less than Jean Monnet, and he especially wanted it to be, more modestly, confederal.

The Fouchet Plan may be considered as one of the great missed chances for integration because, although it went against the most unifying plans at the time, its implementation would nevertheless have formed the basis for a genuine political construct. Instead of this progress, Europe would have to wait years for the ultimate emergence of the TUE, which is scarcely more integrationist than the Fouchet Plan had been.

To gauge the General's contribution to the European question, it would be helpful to consider what the Community might have been without his efforts. Would Europe today be farther along the road to federation? One very much doubts it. Without de Gaulle's double veto, the British would have entered the EEC in 1961 and would assuredly have vigorously opposed the federal and supranational principles for which de Gaulle fought. Not to mention that, with Great Britain and without de Gaulle, the Community would have found itself much more dependent on American interests.

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[40] de Gaulle, *Mémoires d'espoir*, pp. 181-182.
[41] Cited in Alain Peyrefitte, *C'était de Gaulle* (Paris, Fallois/Fayard, 1994), p. 366.

In conclusion, from the end of the Second World War until his death, de Gaulle pitted national reality against supranational plans. In the current movement of bringing peoples together within structures, and soon under the powers that encompass them, how should the historian assess this role? It would seem that the Europe conceived and proposed by de Gaulle was scarcely less constricting for national sovereignty than the union proposed at Maastricht. In the context of the current debate on nationalisms and their various excesses, it would also seem that de Gaulle was, in this century, the great promoter and herald of the fundamentally important idea of the sovereignty of peoples, an idea that common sense appears to recognize today as the natural and necessary stage in their unification.

Lastly, although one can rightly say that de Gaulle was a nationalist, it should be understood that his nationalism excluded the dominant exaltations of which European union has been an unfortunately dialectical consequence. It must be understood that de Gaulle's nationalism meant the affirmation of the reality and dignity of nations, notwithstanding their march, inevitable or otherwise, toward the unification of the continents and the world.

Plekhanov: The Father of Authoritarian Russian Socialism

By Michael Kellogg

Writing of whom he terms "the father of Russian Marxism,"[1] Samuel Baron maintains: "Under attack ever since the Bolshevik revolution, relegated to virtual oblivion in the Stalin era, and only marginally rehabilitated following the Twentieth Party Congress, G. V. Plekhanov has now truly been resurrected in Russia."[2] This assertion may be a slight exaggeration, but with the fall of Communism and the pressing search for a just socio-political order in Russia, Plekhanov's ideas are more relevant now than they have been in decades. Russian Social Democracy has suffered from what Theodore Dan terms the "immemorial, fundamental problem" of the "fusion of democracy and Socialism,"[3] and Plekhanovite thought currently enjoys the reputation of a more inclusive and democratic alternative to Vladimir Lenin's authoritarian Bolshevism.

Western historians have lauded Plekhanov as a principled opponent of arch-centralization. Baron credits him with presciently decrying the perils of authoritarianism years before Stalin rose to power,[4] and Philip Pomper argues that he sought to hinder the "establishment of a new authoritarianism" and to "prepare the way for a proper revolution by the gradual transformation of the spontaneous workers' movement into a broad, conscious revolutionary party."[5] Isaiah Berlin casts the struggle between Plekhanov and Lenin as part of the ongoing battle between "every libertarian and federalist against Jacobins and centralizers,"[6] Edward Carr juxtaposes the "milder and more cautious Plekhanov" with the "bolder and more uncompromising Lenin,"[7] and Nicholas Riasanovsky posits the "fundamental division in modern Russian history" engendered by the break "between the older Marxist who never lost humanistic standards and culture and

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[1] Samuel H. Baron, *Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).
[2] Baron, *Plekhanov in Russian History and Soviet Historiography* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), ix.
[3] Theodore Dan, *The Origins of Bolshevism*, trans. Joel Carmichael (London: Secker & Warburg, 1964), 411.
[4] Baron, *Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism*, 359, 360.
[5] Philip Pomper, *The Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1970), 173.
[6] Isaiah Berlin, *Russian Thinkers* (New York: Penguin, 1978), 222.
[7] Edward Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923*, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1950), 7.

the young fanatic confident that the ends justified the means."[8]

Many Western scholars consider Plekhanov to have championed what may be termed a "democratic" program of working class initiative and political pluralism, yet a careful analysis of Plekhanov's writings and actions does not support this judgment. While the historical record indicates that Plekhanov differed with Lenin on some key issues, most notably regarding the necessity for Socialist revolution only after a full-fledged bourgeois one, he fundamentally agreed with Lenin's centralist, anti-democratic views on Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party organization when he held a secure position of power, only belatedly, tentatively, and contradictorily pleading for greater freedom for debate when his once-mighty influence in the Party was waning.

In retrospect, it may well have been better for the Russian people in the long run if, as the then-Muscovite mayor, Gavril Popov, asserted in 1990, the Bolsheviks had not "outr[u]n the development of productive forces, violated basic ideas of Marxism, and failed to take into consideration the views of leading Marxists like Plekhanov."[9] One must not turn a blind eye on Plekhanov's authoritarian legacy in seeking to salvage a beneficent form of Russian Socialism from the ruins of Lenin and Stalin's Bolshevism, however. Rather than representing the corruption of Plekhanov's ideas, authoritarian Russian Socialism developed as a logical outgrowth of Plekhanovite thought.

Georgii Plekhanov, the 21-year-old son of a strict army officer, had to flee Russia for Switzerland after denouncing the Tsarist regime in a fiery oration in 1876, but he wielded considerable influence upon revolutionary Russian Populist politics from abroad. He soon converted from Populism to Marxism, however, founding the first Russian Marxist organization, the Emancipation of Labor Group, in 1883. In that same year, he laid the theoretical foundations of Russian Marxism in his work, *Socialism and Political Struggle*, which, according to Lenin, influenced Russia as much as *The Communist*

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[8] Nicholas Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia, Third Edition* (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), 527.
[9] Baron, *Plekhanov in Russian History*, ix.

Manifesto had affected the West.[10] Plekhanov's abandonment of his erstwhile Populist comrades is significant since Populism, in Pomper's words, sought the "resolution of the problem of the role of the intelligentsia and the role of the masses in favor of the masses."[11] In rejecting Populism Plekhanov embraced elitism.

In making the case for Plekhanov as upholder of decentralized and pluralistic organizational values, however, historians have made much of his assertion in *Socialism and Political Struggle* that if the People's Will, a clandestine revolutionary movement that used terrorist methods, decided to form a permanent government, then it would either

> have to remain an indifferent spectator of the slow decay of the "economic equality" it has established, or it will be obliged to organize national production. It will have to fulfill this difficult task either in the spirit of modern socialism, in which it will be hindered by its own impracticality as well as by the present stage of development of national labor and the workers' own habits; or it will have to seek salvation in the ideals of "patriarchal and authoritarian communism," only modifying those ideals so that national production is managed not by the Peruvian "sons of the sun" and their officials, but by a socialist caste.[12]

Andrzej Walicki has stressed that Plekhanov "never abandoned" the beliefs he expressed here,[13] and Baron refers to this passage at the end of his seminal work, *Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism*, in order to bolster his case for Plekhanov's inclusive ideals and remarkable prescience.[14] It is worth noting, however, that Lenin also repudiated The People's Will's tactics upon grounds of expediency,[15] but this has not led scholars to view him as an advocate of genuine democracy. Moreover, Plekhanov's primary concern at the time he wrote this was that The People's Will, with whom he had broken in 1879 over the use of terrorism, would try to force socialism upon a backward country that was not yet ready for it. He did not argue for the necessity of a broad and

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[10] Baron, *Plekhanov*, op cite, pp. 4, 18, 19, 78, 143.
[11] Pomper, *The Russian Revolutionary Intelligentsia*, 100.
[12] Plekhanov, "Socialism and Political Struggle," in *G. Plekhanov, Selected Philosophical Works*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947), p. 114.
[13] Andrzej Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism*, trans. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979), p. 415.
[14] Baron, p. 360.
[15] Edmund Wilson, *To the Finland Station* (New York: Farrow, Strass, and Giroux, 1940), p. 463.

democratic Russian Socialist movement per se.

In fact, in "Socialism and Political Struggle," Plekhanov stressed,

> We do not belong to the opponents in principle of such an act as the seizure of power by a revolutionary party. In our opinion that is the last, and what is more, the absolutely inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the political struggle which every class striving for emancipation must undertake at a definite stage in social development.[16]

John Keep thus overstates his case when he asserts of Plekhanov, "In earlier years there had been no lack of warnings as to the perils involved in the seizure of power by a revolutionary minority."[17] Plekhanov's early essay demonstrates that the Marxist theoretician did not oppose a minority seizure of power as such, but merely attacked the notion of a seizure of power carried out immediately under the aegis of his old enemies in The People's Will out of expedience, rather than moral considerations.

Moreover, Plekhanov demonstrated his belief in the necessity of a highly-centralized Russian Socialist Party and not a more democratically organized mass movement in the very preface to "Socialism and Political Struggle," arguing:

> The desire to work *among the people* and for the people, the certitude that "the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves" -- this practical tendency of our *narodism* is just as dear to me as it used to be. But its *theoretical* propositions seem to me, indeed, erroneous in many respects. Years of life abroad and attentive study of the social question have convinced me that the triumph of a spontaneous popular movement similar to Stepan Razin's revolt or the Peasant Wars in Germany cannot satisfy the social and political needs of modern Russia, that the old forms of our national life carried within them many germs of their disintegration and that they cannot "develop into a higher communist form" except under the immediate influence of a strong and well-organized *workers'* socialist party.[18]

Plekhanov thus paid lip service to the attractiveness of a "spontaneous" socialist movement, but he argued that such an entity would be incapable of carrying out a successful socialist revolution, while a more highly-centralized one would.

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[16] Plekhanov, "Socialism and Political Struggle," *Selected Philosophical Works*, p. 109.
[17] John Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 297.
[18] Plekhanov, "Socialism and Political Struggle," *Selected Philosophical Works*, p. 57. Emphasis mine.

In another passage from *Socialism and Political Struggle*, Plekhanov stressed the need for the Russian Socialist intelligentsia to impart consciousness to the masses, thereby contradicting the basic Marxist principle that, as he worded it in a later work, "It is not the consciousness of men which determines their being, but...their social being that determines their consciousness."[19] He argued that the

> socialist intelligentsia....must become the leader of the working class in the impending emancipation movement, explain to it its political and economic interests and also the interdependence of those interests, and must prepare them to play an independent role in the social life of Russia. They must exert all their energy so that in the very opening period of the constitutional life of Russia our working class will be able to come forward as a separate party with a definite social and political program.[20]

Plekhanov feared that without strong Russian Socialist intelligentsia leadership, the working masses would be able to understand neither their political and economic interests nor the interdependence between them and would only be in the position to play a subsidiary role in Russian society. Thus, even in the early stages of his career, Plekhanov clearly favored a tightly-organized and "conscious" workers' party under the control of the socialist intelligentsia. Plekhanov predicted dire consequences if the People's Will were to seize power, but he was more concerned with hindering this particular group with whom he had an acrimonious running dispute from taking power than with arguing for democratic methods per se. Quite the contrary, he believed that Russian conditions necessitated a tightly-run and highly-centralized Socialist Party.

Never an amiable person, with the rise of Eduard Bernstein's Revisionism in the late 1890's, a movement that favored evolutionary instead of revolutionary tactics to achieve material gains for the workers within the framework of capitalism, Plekhanov became increasingly imperious and unwilling to compromise with those in the recently-founded Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party who did not unquestioningly accept

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[19] Plekhanov, *The Development of the Monist View of History*, trans. Andrew Rothstein (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1947), p. 330.
[20] Plekhanov, "Socialism and Political Struggle," *Selected Philosophical Works*, pp. 57-58.

his will. In April 1899, he wrote Pavel Akselrod and Vera Zasulich regarding Revisionism: "If you want to participate in the upcoming struggle, well and good. If not, I alone will follow the path which my duty as a revolutionary requires me to follow."[21] Plekhanov took it upon himself to define what constituted deviation from orthodox Marxism, and his brusque tone with his ideological comrades demonstrates his unwillingness to consider alternative vantage points.

Plekhanov further manifested his intransigence at the August 1900 organizational meeting for two new Social-Democratic newspapers, *Iskra* (*The Spark*), and *Zaria* (*The Dawn*), stressing the need to eliminate ideological nonconformity within the Party. Though Lenin later became famed for his hard-line stance towards Party organization, his proposal for *Iskra*'s Opening Editorial Statement envisioned the newspaper as an instrument of "general democracy." Lenin stressed:

> We do not claim that our views in their entirety are the views of all Russian Social Democrats, we do not deny that differences exist, nor shall we attempt to gloss over or obliterate these differences. On the contrary, we desire our publications to become organs of discussion of all questions by all Russian Social Democrats of the most diverse shades of opinion.[22]

In his effort to assert his complete dominance over *Iskra*, the political organ through which he intended to impose his will on Russian Social Democratic politics from exile in Switzerland, however, Plekhanov impatiently brushed aside Lenin's proposals aside. He so severely upbraided Lenin for his mildness towards advocates of Revisionism that Lenin later seethed at what he regarded as the "degrading" manner in which Plekhanov had handled him.[23] Plekhanov then threatened to withdraw from *Iskra*'s Editorial Board in order to frighten Lenin and the others into acquiescing to his demands, and they granted him two votes on the Editorial Staff of six. Lenin greatly resented what he came to see as a "trick" and a "calculated chess move aimed at naive pigeons."[24] Lenin also wrote that

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[21] Leopold Haimson, *The Russian Marxists & The Origins of Bolshevism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), 88.
[22] Baron, 211.
[23] Ibid., pp. 212, 214.
[24] Haimson, pp. 139, 140.

Plekhanov had revealed himself as a "bad man, inspired by petty motives of personal vanity and conceit - an insincere man."[25]

At Plekhanov's insistence, *Iskra*'s Editorial Board asserted that in order to "establish and consolidate Party unity...it is necessary first of all to bring about unity of ideas which will remove differences of opinion." *Iskra*'s Opening Editorial Statement stressed: "Before we can unite, and in order that we may unite, we must first of all firmly and definitely draw the lines of demarcation between the various [anti-Tsarist] groups."[26] Plekhanov imperiously relegated for himself the role of chief Party ideologue who would determine what represented true Marxist ideology and what deviated unacceptably from it.

Writing of the discord between Plekhanov and Lenin over *Iskra*'s editorial policy, Baron posits: "As Lenin describes the clash, one sees an obstinate, egotistical, and power-hungry man outrageously humiliating and exploiting a younger comrade who came to him in a spirit of reverence and devotion." Baron concedes, "When he resolved to be disagreeable, Plekhanov had few equals," but he then asserts that "differences of principle and not Plekhanov's 'repellent' qualities must still be seen as the chief source of the conflict." Baron further insists that "the quarrel was not so much a personal one as an early instance of disagreement on the nature of the Party - on the limits of diversity admissible within its bounds, and on how it should stand with reference to other parties."[27]

Given that Plekhanov severely berated Lenin for *excessively* tolerating divergent points of view, it seems odd that Baron nevertheless counts Plekhanov among the ranks of those who fundamentally opposed authoritarian Russian Social Democracy. Moreover, by downplaying the personal differences between Plekhanov and Lenin, Baron weakens his argument that Plekhanov was at heart much more democratic than Lenin. One could attempt to bolster the case for Plekhanov as anti-authoritarian by attributing his early dispute with Lenin primarily to psychological differences, but Baron downplays this

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[25] Baron, 212.
[26] Ibid., pp. 214, 215.
[27] Ibid., pp. 209, 210, 213.

aspect, thereby rendering his case for Plekhanov as anti-authoritarian that much more tenuous.

After this meeting, Lenin, largely due to Plekhanov's influence, became convinced of the necessity for a highly-centralized Party and grew contemptuous of democratic safeguards altogether. Lenin published his famous brochure, "What Is to Be Done? [*Chto delat*]" in February of 1902. In this work he came down decidedly on the side of the "consciousness" of the revolutionary intelligentsia against the "spontaneity" of the workers, denouncing the "slavish cringing before spontaneity" prevalent in the Party. He quoted from Plekhanov himself in making his arguments, noting that the latter had observed that too many Russian Social Democrats mistakenly gazed "in awe" upon the "posterior" of the Russian proletariat. Lenin disparaged the capabilities of the working class in general, asserting that "the working class exclusively by its own efforts is able to develop only trade-union consciousness" since "class political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without."[28]

Lenin called for a tightly-organized and secret organization made up of "professional revolutionaries" to avoid the Tsarist police, and he ridiculed the idea of making any attempts at "playing at democracy." He argued that "'freedom of criticism means freedom for an opportunist trend in social-democracy, freedom to convert social-democracy into a democratic party of reform, freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas and elements into socialism." He stressed the need for a small and conspiratorial cadre of committed revolutionaries, positing: "This organization must perforce not be very extensive and must be as secret as possible."[29] He further maintained:

> If we begin with the solid foundation of a strong organization of revolutionaries, we can ensure the stability of the movement as a whole and carry out the aims both of social-democracy and of trade unions proper. If, however, we begin with a broad workers' organization, which is supposedly most "accessible" to the masses (but which is actually most accessible to the gendarmes and makes revolutionaries

[28] Vladimir Lenin, *What Is to Be Done*, trans. Joe Fineberg and George Hanna (London: Penguin, 1988), pp. 98, 101, 143, 169.
[29] Ibid., pp. 77, 172, 174, 200.

most accessible to the police), we shall achieve neither the one aim nor the other.[30]

As well as specifically supporting Lenin's conclusions in "What Is to Be Done?" after the pamphlet was published in 1902, in the period between the turn of the century and the Second Party Congress in the summer of 1903, Plekhanov stressed the critical importance of the "conscious" Social-Democratic intelligentsia and lamented the workers' lack of consciousness, calling for a highly-centralized Party structure. Indeed, during this time, Plekhanov made numerous assertions that appear as if they could have come directly from the pages of "What Is to Be Done?" In early 1900, for instance, two years before Lenin's publication, Plekhanov disparaged the intellectual capacities of the workers in an argument that influenced Lenin's own views, arguing:

> Only two things are known to the workers: 1) their own, clearly recognized, concrete interests, and 2) their position...among other classes. Hence the role of the superstructure, educated Social Democracy, is to understand the interests of the given moment, that is, the active psychological basis that is the motivating force of the masses, and, secondly, to understand the possible broader and truer position of the masses in the middle of all other entities at the given moment.[31]

In an article of February 1900 Plekhanov further maintained that once the Russian Social-Democratic intelligentsia had understood the political, social, and economic situation of the country, it had to begin "explaining [these interests] to the working class immediately" and to "speak both of social revolution and the seizure of power by the working class." He even stressed that the intelligentsia had to do no less than to "awaken the consciousness of the working class."[32] In other words, Plekhanov advocated the very "Leninesque" argument that, left to themselves, the Russian workers would not be able to draw the necessary historical conclusions to carry out socialist revolution.

Not only did Plekhanov assert that the Russian Social-Democratic intelligentsia had to instill consciousness in the workers from without, he deplored what he regarded as the chaos resulting from internal debate. He lamented the "mess that prevails among us now,

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[30] Ibid., p. 181.
[31] Plekhanov, "Sbornik materialov, izdannyi gruppoi 'osvobozhdenie truda,'" in *Sochineniia*, vol. 12, ed. D. Riazanov (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1926), p. 490.
[32] Plekhanov, "Predislovie k vademecum," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 12, pp. 15, 37.

thanks to which it may soon truthfully be said that where two Russian Social Democrats meet, three Social-Democratic Parties will most likely spring up." He melodramatically asserted, "I confess that I never thought that it would be my lot to suffer such shame! We must get out of this chaotic and disgraceful situation at all costs. Woe to the party that patiently endures such confusion!"[33] Far from advocating lively internal debate, Plekhanov emphasized the need for a streamlined and centralized Social-Democratic Party that clung to Marxist dogma as interpreted by himself.

While Baron stresses Plekhanov's supposed commitment to cooperate with Russian liberals as evidenced by the older man's 1895 comment to the young Lenin, "You turn your back to the liberals and we our face,"[34] Plekhanov demonstrated his elitist philosophy and basic distrust of left liberal elements in Russian society in his April 1901 article, "Once Again Socialism and Political Struggle." ["Esche raz sotsializm i politicheskaia borba"] He expressed his apprehension at being subsumed into the "mass of other anti-governmental elements," stressing that "precisely the transformation of Social Democrats into ordinary democrats would signify the abandonment of the class struggle and the rapprochement of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie."[35] Plekhanov thus favored a highly elitist and intractable stance vis-à-vis other groups in Russian society that were striving to overthrow Tsarism.

The very idea of constructing a decentralized Party organization repelled Plekhanov. In his June 1901 article, "New Wine in Old Wine-Skins," ["Novoe vino v starykh mekhakh"] Plekhanov demonstrated that his earlier critique of The People's Will put forth in *Socialism and Political Struggle* had been primarily based on expedient and not moral considerations. Plekhanov rebuked his critics who argued that a "secret and strictly-centralized" Social Democratic Party organization would represent a throwback to the time of the People's Will, maintaining that the idea of a highly-centralized

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[33] Plekhanov, "Predislovie k vademecum," *Sochineniia*, vol. 12, pp. 41-42.
[34] Baron, p. 155.
[35] Plekhanov, "Eshche raz sotsializm i politicheskaia borba," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 12, p. 101.

revolutionary body predated this organization. He concluded that a "secret, strictly-clandestine and centralized organization is essential for any revolutionary party that is vigorously fighting under contemporary Russian conditions."[36] Thus, Plekhanov reached the same conclusion that Lenin later advocated in "What Is to Be Done?"

In his "Commentary on the R[ussian] S[ocial]-D[emocratic] W[orkers'] P[arty] Program," published in *Zaria* a few months after the appearance of "What Is to be Done?," Plekhanov reiterated his fundamentally anti-democratic views. Using a military metaphor, as he was wont to do, he stressed that the Social-Democratic intelligentsia represented the "vanguard" of the "workers' army." He quoted from Lenin himself in emphasizing the critical importance of the "revolutionary bacillus." Referring to an article in which Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels had gladly renounced "cheap democratic popularity," he boasted that Social Democrats now constituted "the vast majority in our revolutionary milieu," but he emphasized that they would "have to dismiss [democratic popularity] if it became necessary for the interests of our cause."[37] In asserting this, Plekhanov demonstrated that he would gladly defy his comrades' wishes if he deemed it necessary to further what he regarded as the needs of "orthodox" Marxism.

Moreover, in "Commentary" Plekhanov argued that the Social-Democratic intelligentsia could not even consider surrendering its leadership role to the workers. Refuting an argument that a critic had leveled against Lenin's emphasis on the importance of the "revolutionary bacillus," Plekhanov stressed: "Social Democracy can never agree with this ludicrous and disgraceful role as the fifth wheel of the wagon without committing suicide."[38] The forceful language Plekhanov employed here conveys how strongly he believed in the necessity for a committed cadre of revolutionary leaders to rule over what he viewed as the vacillating working class.

The organizational views of Plekhanov and Lenin in the time directly before the

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[36] Plekhanov, "Novoe vino v starykh mekhakh,"in *Sochineniia*, vol. 12, p. 121.
[37] Plekhanov, "Kommentarii k proektu programmy R.S.-D.R.P.," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 12, p. 213.
[38] Ibid., p. 228.

Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party thus closely resembled each other. In fact, Lenin received much of the impetus for his arguments in favor of strict centralization from Plekhanov himself. It is thus not clear why Baron remarks of the Congress that "most incredibly of all, it aligned *together*, Plekhanov and Lenin."[39] As we have seen, their ideological positions before the Congress regarding Party organization were nearly identical, and the affinity between Plekhanov's and Lenin's theories manifested itself even more clearly at the Congress, over which Plekhanov presided.

At the Second Party Congress that met in Brussels and London for three weeks in July and August of 1903, Lenin's draft for the Party rules unleashed a controversy over Party organization that brought about the Bolshevik-Menshevik split. Lenin's draft stipulated, "Anyone is considered a Party member who accepts the program and supports the Party both materially and by participation in one of the Party organizations." Iurii Martov offered a counter-proposal arguing that members should only have to work under the guidance of a Party organization. Martov's proposal won the day, but Plekhanov voted for Lenin's draft, the only member of *Iskra*'s six member editorial staff other than Lenin to do so.[40] While Sheila Fitzpatrick has counted Plekhanov as an opponent of Lenin at the crucial Second Party Congress,[41] in fact, Plekhanov voted with Lenin on *every single issue* at the Congress, thus demonstrating that his actions, when they mattered most, supported Lenin's authoritarian views.

Baron has tried to cast Plekhanov's actions in a more favorable light. "Plekhanov's conduct at the Congress," he argues, "is partly to be explained by his failure to grasp the full indications of Lenin's organizational scheme."[42] Ignorance is not a very flattering defense in any case, and Plekhanov was nothing if not perceptive. Plekhanov's speeches at the Congress demonstrated that he fully understood and accepted Lenin's doctrines of

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[39] Baron, p. 234.
[40] Ibid., pp. 237, 240.
[41] Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 30.
[42] Baron, p. 244.

working-class torpor and the need for highly-centralized leadership from the Social-Democratic intelligentsia. Plekhanov defended Lenin against his critics to the full and praised him for understanding that "if you eliminate the [revolutionary] 'bacillus,' then you will only be left with the unconscious masses, whose consciousness must be brought in from without."[43]

In addition to postulating in Leninesque fashion that the workers could not become "conscious" without the guidance of the intelligentsia, Plekhanov admonished the Congress delegates, "We must not imitate the anarchy of the 70's, but avoid it. Supporters of Martov's draft claim that the right to name oneself a member of the Party has great moral significance. I cannot agree with this, however." He attacked V. P. Akimov for criticizing Lenin, arguing that Akimov had understood "neither Lenin's phrases, nor our draft." Comparing Akimov with Napoleon, who had wanted his marshals to divorce their wives, Plekhanov stressed, "I will not become divorced from Lenin, and I hope that he likewise does not intend to divorce himself from me," to which Lenin laughed and shook his head negatively.[44] Plekhanov's use of familial language with regard to Lenin further demonstrated the ideological affinity that the two men shared.

At the Congress, Plekhanov exhibited his scorn for democratic safeguards within the Party. He asserted that "he who wishes to remain a member of the Party must stay rooted within the Program even in his criticism," thereby implicitly threatening to expel those who did not toe the Party line as interpreted by himself. He stressed the importance of maintaining strict ideological unity with regard to outside elements and those lower in the Social-Democratic hierarchy, insisting that "the discipline of every collegium is obligatory with regard to outsiders and the lower levels of authority, but not with regard to the highest."[45] In other words, the higher Party echelons, while possessing a strictly-limited right to internal debate as long as they remained within certain narrow ideological

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[43] Plekhanov, "Rechi na vtorom ocherednom sezde R.S.-D.R.P.," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 12, p. 416.
[44] Ibid., pp. 418, 427.
[45] Ibid., pp. 412, 426.

parameters, had to present a determined front to outsiders and to expect complete obedience from below.

Plekhanov further dismissed democratic safeguards by asserting:

> Every given democratic principle must be considered not by itself in abstraction, but in relation to the principle that may be called the fundamental principle of democracy, namely the principle that *salus populi suprema lex*. In translation to the language of the revolutionary, this means that the success of the revolution is the highest law. And if it were necessary to restrict this or that democratic principle for the sake of the success of the revolution, then it would be criminal to balk at such a restriction....The suitability of such a measure could only be judged on the basis of the rule: *salus revolutiae suprema lex*.[46]

While Riasanovsky has emphasized the "fundamental division in modern Russian history between the older Marxist who never lost humanistic standards and culture and the young fanatic confident that the ends justified the means"[47] at this crucial meeting, Plekhanov unequivocally advocated precisely that for which Riasanovsky reproaches Lenin. Baron views Plekhanov's speech as an aberration made in the heat of the battle without due consideration. Without presenting any evidence to back his assertion, Baron argues that Plekhanov "lived to regret this speech with every sinew of his being."[48] Plekhanov made his oration in full consciousness of what he was positing, however, and as we shall clearly see, he upheld the validity of his notion "*salus revolutiae suprema lex*" years after the Congress, even after he had begun his vicious war against Lenin.

Rather than deciding hastily, Plekhanov carefully deliberated on the debate between Martov and Lenin and came down clearly and unambiguously on Lenin's side. At one point during the Congress, Plekhanov forcefully expressed his beliefs regarding the Party rules: "The more that was said on this subject, and the more thoughtfully that I pondered the speeches of the orators, the more firmly has the conviction grown up in me that the truth is on Lenin's side." The last words Plekhanov spoke at the Congress, after hearing all of the pros and cons of Lenin's position and carefully considering its merits and

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[46] Ibid., pp. 418, 419.
[47] Riasanovsky, p. 527.
[48] Baron, p. 242.

faults, were: "Lenin's draft may serve as a bulwark against [bourgeois individualists'] intrusion into the Party, and for this reason alone opponents of opportunism should vote for it."[49] A close examination of the records of the Second Party Congress thus demonstrates that Plekhanov unreservedly backed Lenin's pleas for rigid centralization to the end.

Within a few months of the Second Party Congress, however, Plekhanov performed what Baron rightly describes as a "stunning volte-face" in "turning his cudgels" upon Lenin. Baron refuses to consider that something other than principled disagreement lay at the heart of the dispute between the two Social-Democratic leaders, however. Rather than regarding Plekhanov's assault upon Lenin as a tactical move to attempt to weaken a dangerous rival for Party leadership, Baron asserts of Plekhanov:

> His reversal constitutes decisive evidence that his Bolshevism at the Congress was not nearly so resolute and unequivocal as it appeared to many. Though overshadowed by their evident unity, in retrospect the differences between Lenin and Plekhanov at the Congress are significant. They help to account for what otherwise defies rational explanation.[50]

Baron's assertion notwithstanding, the evidence appears far from decisive that Plekhanov's Bolshevistic, i.e., authoritarian, tendencies were only superficial, and in fact supports exactly the opposite conclusion. Baron does not specify what "differences" at the Congress he has in mind, and, indeed, the record does not indicate any significant ones. On the contrary, Plekhanov's supposed Menshevistic or inclusive and not his Bolshevistic or exclusive tendencies were not resolute and unequivocal. Plekhanov moved against Lenin after the Congress primarily for power political reasons that had little to do with what Baron regards as "rational" philosophical differences.

Baron vaguely suggests that "freedom of criticism" posed a "possibility of discord" between Plekhanov and Lenin at the Second Party Congress and afterwards, without specifying precisely what he means by this.[51] Baron's argument is hard to reconcile with Plekhanov's assertion at the Congress that "he who wishes to remain a member of the

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[49] Plekhanov, "Rechi na vtorom ocherednom sezde R.S.-D.R.P.," pp. 426, 427.
[50] Baron, p. 244.
[51] Ibid.

Party must stay rooted within the Program even in his criticism,"[52] however. Moreover, months after the Congress, Plekhanov made the following decidedly unequivocal assertion against freedom of expression within the Party's ranks:

> A party is a union freely composed of like-minded peers. As soon as like-mindedness disappears, divergence becomes inevitable. To foist on a party such members who do not share its views in the name of freedom of opinion is to constrain its freedom of choice and to hamper the success of its activities.[53]

Plekhanov wished to brush aside views in the Party that differed from his own to the greatest extent possible.

In October 1903, Plekhanov attempted to outmaneuver Lenin by campaigning to reinstate the four members of *Iskra*'s Editorial Board who had been forced out at the Second Party Congress. Plekhanov knew that Lenin would not countenance this, so he used his old tactic of threatening to resign from *Iskra*'s Editorial Staff to win concessions. Lenin, fearing that he would be blamed if Plekhanov left *Iskra*, stepped down himself.[54] As soon as Lenin left, Plekhanov launched a major broadside against his erstwhile ally in an article in *Iskra*, "What Is Not to Be Done." ["Chego ne delat'"] The very title of his essay belies Baron's mild assertion that Plekhanov merely "put some distance between Lenin and himself."[55]

In "What is Not to Be Done," Plekhanov cast aspersions on Lenin's character and intellectual abilities, arguing that the Party needed leaders who were distinguished not only by "boldness, persistence, and determination, but also by great circumspection." He warned against people who displayed "ordinary stubbornness," stressed that Party leaders needed to be "wise like the Serpent," and insinuated that Lenin was simply "stupid." Plekhanov went so far as to suggest that Lenin should withdraw from politics, noting that the first sign of political wisdom lay in being able to take the current state of affairs into account, and that he who did not have this ability "was not destined for political activity

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[52] Plekhanov, "Rechi na vtorom ocherednom sezde R.S.-D.R.P.," p. 426.
[53] Plekhanov, "Krasnyi sezd v krasnoi strane," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 12, p. 455.
[54] Baron, p. 246.
[55] Baron, p. 412.

and would act more sensibly if he were to decline every sort of political role."[56]

Alluding to Lenin, Plekhanov somewhat vaguely asserted, "Consistent Marxists cannot be and, of course, will not be utopians of centralism." Whatever he meant by "utopians of centralism," as we have seen, Plekhanov had earlier repeatedly stressed the virtues of a highly-centralized Party. Based on his record, Plekhanov could not logically exclude himself from the ranks of "utopians of centralism." Suddenly abandoning the arguments in favor of strict Party centralization that he had been advancing for years, Plekhanov warned that if the Party were to be organized in a rigidly-centralized manner, then "every mistake made by the center would inevitably spread out to the periphery."[57] Since Plekhanov had long championed such a strong Party center, however, his primary concern with a centralized Party seems to have been his fear of a powerful central organization that Lenin, and not he, would dominate. Plekhanov thus attacked Lenin out of tactical expediency rather than moral conviction.

Conveniently neglecting the fact that at the Second Party Congress he had sanctioned removing Party members for breaches of Party doctrine, Plekhanov asked his readers to imagine a Party center filled with "determined and unflagging enemies of 'Revisionism,' along the lines Lenin put forward in "What Is To Be Done?" He asserted that if this center were to "expel" them, that would "certainly be easy and as 'direct' as possible. But would that....be beneficial for the unity of our Party and for the struggle with 'Revisionism?' We think not."[58] This was a strange position indeed for a man to take who had devoted his previous career to delineating "orthodox" Marxism and ostracizing those who, in his eyes, deviated from it.

The same man who recently had stressed that freedom of criticism had to be kept within the narrowest of bounds when he had been the undisputed leader of Russian Social

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[56] Plekhanov, "Chego ne delat'," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, ed. D. Riazanov (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1926), pp. 3, 4, 10.
[57] Ibid., pp., 3, 10.
[58] Ibid., p. 5.

Democracy now suddenly claimed, "Earlier we fought with each other. Now we may engage in the exchange of ideas"[59] when faced with Lenin's serious challenge to his leading position in the Party. Plekhanov had helped to inspire Lenin's elitist, consciousness-oriented, centralist, and anti-democratic views, and he had supported the young Marxist theoretician as long as it seemed that he remained within his orbit; but when Lenin's growing power and ambition became evident at the Congress and afterwards, Plekhanov, ironically enough, suddenly began to posit the need for greater debate in an attempt to silence his principle opponent for Party leadership.

Even in "What Is Not to Be Done," Plekhanov seemed most concerned not with the need to decentralize the Party but with the necessity of "guarding unity with all of our strength," however. He stressed the value of strong Party discipline, arguing that even in a liberal state and certainly in the Russian system where the Party did not have the ability to operate openly, the most important task for Russian Social Democrats was that of their "self-education in the spirit of Party discipline." Moreover, he warned against any tendencies towards "anarchical individualism, which greatly hampers harmonious concerted work." He further emphasized, "Our center is obliged to concern itself extremely strictly with breaches of discipline in our ranks."[60] Plekhanov sensed that his position of power was becoming increasingly insecure, and he took strong countermeasures in an unsuccessful attempt to halt this process.

Plekhanov argued in his January 1904 article, "A Sad Misunderstanding," that centralization as such did not represent the problem, but that the lack thereof did. While admitting that he had belonged to the majority, or Bolsheviks, at the Second Party Congress, he wrote that the Congress had brought about an "abnormal" situation in which "people elected by one half [of the delegates] were to lead everyone." He wished the Central Committee to serve as the "expression of our Party as a whole, and not only one of

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[59] Ibid., p. 6.
[60] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

its parts." He claimed that the Central Committee had become "eccentric," when in fact it had to be "central."[61] Despite his anti-Leninist polemics, Plekhanov still wrote of the virtues of a tightly-run, united organization that did not allow a plurality of viewpoints.

Thus, what increasingly emerged in Plekhanov's writings was not his conscientious objection to the dangers of extreme centralization and the lack of democratic safeguards in the Party, but his growing fear of the disintegration of the Party into two warring halves that did not accept his leadership. His halting and half-hearted advocacy of freedom of opinion sprang not from principled opposition to Lenin's organizational plans in theory, but from fear that in practice Lenin threatened to sweep him from the nexus of power. Plekhanov's comments about "brotherly *Schadenfreude*" and "comradely sniggers"[62] prevalent in the Party demonstrate the stinging perception he had that he was losing the power and respect that he had once possessed.

Lenin, justifiably angered at his former mentor's attacks upon him, responded to Plekhanov in his pamphlet of May 1904, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back." Lenin noted that his critics had "accepted without a murmur" Point 18 of the Organizing Committee's Regulations for the Second Party Congress, which stipulated that "all decisions of the Congress and all the elections it carries out are decisions of the Party and binding on all Party organizations" and "cannot be challenged by anyone on any pretext whatever and can be rescinded or amended only by the next Party Congress." Lenin pointedly asked, "Has anyone ever seen a *party* organ whose editorial board said after a congress the very opposite of what they had said at the congress?"[63] It is easy to understand why Lenin felt that Plekhanov had betrayed him.

Almost simultaneously with Lenin's brochure, Plekhanov published a pamphlet in May of 1904 entitled, "Centralism or Bonapartism?" ["Tsentralizm ili Bonapartizm?"] in

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[61] Plekhanov, "Grustnoe nedorazumenie," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, pp. 54-55.
[62] Plekhanov, "Zabavnoe nedorazumenie," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, p. 40.
[63] Lenin, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," *V. I. Lenin, Collected Works*, vol. 7, trans. Abraham Fineberg and Naomi Jochel (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), p. 208.

which he intensified his attacks upon Lenin. In a celebrated section of this work, Plekhanov argued,

> Imagine that we all agreed that the Central Committee should possess the still-debated right of "liquidation." Here is what would happen. Since a Congress is approaching, the C.C. "liquidates" all the elements with which it is dissatisfied, plants its own creatures everywhere, and, filling all the committees with these creatures, easily guarantees itself a fully submissive majority at the Congress. The Congress constituted of the creatures of the C.C. yells "Hurrah!" in unison, approves all of its successful and unsuccessful actions, and applauds all of its plans and initiatives. Then, in reality, there would be neither a majority nor a minority in the Party, for we would have realized the ideal of the Persian Shah."[64]

Baron quotes this passage at the end of his Plekhanov biography, arguing: "As for the character of Party life as it developed under the aegis of Stalin, what could be a better description than Plekhanov's critique of the implications of Lenin's organizational plans, written in 1904?"[65] Plekhanov did indeed make a powerful statement against a Central Committee with sweeping powers, but one must remember that his own political fortunes were on the wane when he wrote this and that he essentially argued against the very position that he had openly supported only a brief time before. Moreover, Plekhanov stressed that his differences with Lenin were essentially ones of degree and not of kind when he asserted, "I am a centralist, but not a Bonapartist."[66]

The precise connotations that Plekhanov attached to his epithet "Bonapartist" are unclear, but the editors of a recent edition of *The Communist Manifesto* write:

> Bonapartism originates in a period of social crisis and strives to concentrate executive power in the hands of a "strong man." The Bonapartist leader presents himself as standing above contending class forces with the aim of maintaining the power of the dominant social class or layer. The term refers to the regime of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte in France 1852-70.[67]

Based on his record, the label of "Bonapartist" could just as easily apply to Plekhanov as to Lenin. Deciphering Plekhanov's language, it seems that a "centralist" supported a highly-

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[64] Plekhanov, "Tsentralizm ili Bonapartizm?," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, p. 92.
[65] Baron, p. 360.
[66] Plekhanov, "Tsentralizm ili Bonapartizm?," p. 92.
[67] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Pathfinder, 1987), p. 58.

centralized Party organization in which Plekhanov was the dominant figure, whereas a "Bonapartist" supported a highly centralized Party organization in which Lenin held sway.

Even in "Centralism or Bonapartism?," moreover, which Baron has interpreted as an all-out assault against Lenin's principles of strict central control of Party operations, Plekhanov affirmed the basic validity of Lenin's organizational plans as put forward at the Second Party Congress. He admitted that he believed that Martov's proposal at the Congress "would have opened the door" for "various opportunistic elements," and that "in order to eliminate this danger, I said that it would be necessary to accept the formula that Comrade Lenin insisted upon. Even now I continue to think that Lenin's formula was more felicitous."[68] Here Plekhanov admitted that even a year after the Congress, he still fundamentally agreed with the views of the man whom he had been castigating mercilessly, thereby demonstrating tactical rather than philosophical differences.

Later in May 1904, presumably after familiarizing himself with Lenin's critique of him in "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," Plekhanov sought to sweep his opponent aside with calls for Party unity, casting himself as the savior-unifier of the Party in his article, "Silence Is Not Possible Now." ["Teper' molchanie nevozmozhno"] Plekhanov accused Lenin of "most conspicuously and consistently" ascribing to the politics of "Bonapartism," and he asked for support in ostracizing him. He stressed that for Social-Democratic unity it was necessary to "eliminate the misunderstandings that stand in its way. Let Lenin engender them, for this is in his interests. We ought to act in the opposite manner for the interests of our cause, however."[69] In June of that month, Plekhanov even suggested that it would be best for the Central Committee to deprive Lenin of his powers.[70]

Plekhanov issued his most stinging criticism of Lenin to date in his July 1904 work, "The Working Class and the Social-Democratic Intelligentsia." ["Rabochii klass i sotsial-

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[68] Plekhanov, "Tsentralizm ili Bonapartizm?," p. 85.
[69] Plekhanov, "Teper' molchanie nevozmozhno," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, p. 110.
[70] Plekhanov, "Otvet tov. Liadovu," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, p. 112.

demokraticheskaia intelligentsia"] Plekhanov reached new heights of vindictiveness, arguing that "had Lenin even bothered to think," he would not have come up with such "unexpected nonsense." He referred to Lenin's "strange doctrine," and argued that the Bolshevik leader had "shamefully missed the mark."[71] Plekhanov then poured salt into the wound, anticipating his later assertion that Lenin had always been "utterly careless" philosophically,[72] by positing: "I have never considered Lenin to be any sort of outstanding theorist, and I have always considered him to be biologically incapable of dialectical thought."[73]

Plekhanov clearly dissembled when he made this last assertion, for if he had always been convinced that Lenin was intellectually lacking, he never would have supported him as strongly as he had both at the Second Party Congress and before. Moreover, a piece of his personal correspondence also clearly contradicts his assertion that he never thought very highly of Lenin. He wrote Akselrod in 1901: "That Petrov [Lenin] is a good fellow I never doubted, and after the journey to Munich [for a conference of editors], even less so."[74] Plekhanov profoundly changed his views of Lenin precisely because of the intense psychological conflict between the two men that Baron is loathe to acknowledge. In defending his turnaround with regard to Lenin by attacking his intellect, Plekhanov overcompensated for what was a weak case to begin with, stressing his supposed long-standing disparagement of Lenin's intellectual capabilities in order to draw attention from the fact that he had earlier openly espoused Lenin's organizational schemes.

Plekhanov further claimed that in "One Step Forwards, Two Steps Back," Lenin, in "logically developing his thoughts," had taken "many steps backwards even in comparison with his brochure 'What Is To Be Done?'" He argued that in order to take a "genuine and not a sham 'step forward,'" it was necessary to understand the relationship between

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[71] Plekhanov, "Rabochii klass i sotsial-demokraticheskaia intelligentsiia," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, pp. 118-120, 128.
[72] Plekhanov, "Vybrannye mesta iz perepiski c druziami,"in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, p. 274.
[73] Plekhanov, "Rabochii klass i sotsial-demokraticheskaia intelligentsiia," p. 135.
[74] Baron, p. 215.

societal thought and existence as Lenin had failed to do. The elder Marxist asked if "scientific socialism" could have developed "completely independently of the spontaneous growth of the workers' movement," and he answered, "Of course not!" Plekhanov also took issue with Lenin's assertion about trade-union consciousness. He noted that according to theories of "historical materialism," which posited that "being determines consciousness," and scientific socialism, which held that socialist revolution would inevitably follow from capitalism's inner contradictions, it was "clear" that the workers of sufficiently developed capitalist states would inaugurate socialism "even if left to 'their own devices.'"[75]

Again, one must remark upon the fact that Plekhanov had not criticized Lenin's brochure when it was under intense discussion much earlier, but had argued along the same lines both before and after it was published. It seems rather suspicious, indeed, that Plekhanov only remarked about the flaws he had allegedly always discerned in the intensely controversial writing over two years after its initial publication. Moreover, it is necessary to keep in mind that Plekhanov had earlier repeatedly stressed that the working masses on their own were incapable of developing their own class consciousness and instead needed to have consciousness brought to them from without. As we have seen, Plekhanov had earlier helped to engender Lenin's fixation on the virtues of centralization, even equating leaving the workers to themselves with "suicide."[76]

In "The Working Class and the Social-Democratic Intelligentsia," Plekhanov addressed the obvious question of why he had not critiqued Lenin's allegedly grave errors earlier. He claimed that he had not become aware of Lenin's theoretical flaws only recently, but had recognized the incorrectness of Lenin's views right from the time when he had first met the young Marxist. He asserted, "Only after the Congress did I see that my extreme aversion to fighting with Lenin and firm intention 'not to divorce' from him

[75] Plekhanov, "Rabochii klass i sotsial-demokraticheskaia intelligentsiia," pp. 117, 121, 135.
[76] Plekhanov, "Kommentarii k proektu programmy R.S.-D.R.P.," p. 228.

were harmful for our Party," and that when he realized that Lenin was inclining towards dictatorship, he "decided to fight and to argue [with him], following the only rule that applies in this situation: better late than never."[77]

Keep believes that Plekhanov's excuses testify to the theoretician's "intellectual honesty,"[78] but they would be more accurately regarded as a form of subterfuge. Plekhanov's arguments that he had always disagreed with Lenin and recognized his reputedly grievous theoretical flaws with regard to strict Party organization and the crucial role of the intelligentsia from the very outset are patently false, as is his claim that he refrained from disputing with Lenin due to his peaceful nature. Throughout his career, Plekhanov had never hesitated to attack those with whom he disagreed, for instance walking out on the Land and Liberty movement, the precursor to The People's Will, in 1879,[79] storming out of the League of Russian Social Democrats Abroad in April of 1900,[80] and threatening to resign from *Iskra* in order to gain sweeping powers of control.[81]

In his struggle with the Bolshevik leader, Plekhanov blasted Lenin for believing that "the grass is always greener on [his] side of the fence."[82] This charge could apply to Plekhanov as well, for he continually stressed that he was right whereas his opponents, primarily Lenin, were wrong. Plekhanov also rebuked Lenin by arguing that attempts to force the Party in line made by one "alpha wolf" (vozhakom) were doomed to failure. Yet Plekhanov himself was never afraid to act as an "alpha wolf" or military commander, as when he made statements to the effect that "all the members of our working class army must hold their positions, and woe to those who voluntarily desert them at this critical moment!"[83] Plekhanov, the son of an army officer, wished to assert his unquestioned dominance in the Party, and his conflict with Lenin must be understood much more in the

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[77] Plekhanov, "Rabochii klass i sotsial-demokraticheskaia intelligentsiia,", pp. 135, 139, 140.
[78] Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia*, p. 147.
[79] Baron, p. 42.
[80] Keep, p. 58.
[81] Haimson, p. 139.
[82] Plekhanov, "O nashei taktike po otnosheniiu k borbe liberalnoi burzhuazii c tsarismom," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, p. 170.
[83] Plekhanov, "V ozhidanii pervogo maia," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, p. 218.

sense of a power struggle between two obstinate combatants than a true ideological dispute over the degree of centralization necessary for the good of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party.

In his later writings, Plekhanov offered contradictory explanations as to why he had not criticized Lenin earlier. While, in the summer of 1904, he had argued that he had always recognized the grave errors inherent in Lenin's thought, in his article of March 1905, "On Some of Our 'Inadequacies,'" he offered another excuse for his failure to indict Lenin earlier, that of negligence. He argued, "If we had not neglected theory, then the weak points of Lenin's brochure, "What Is to Be Done?," would all have arrested our attention immediately upon its appearance, and then there would not be this disturbance among us that is tearing us up now."[84] Plekhanov's statements that he: 1) had always recognized the severely flawed nature of Lenin's thought and 2) had remained largely ignorant of Lenin's views, of course, nullify each other. In reality, Plekhanov neither had the wool pulled over his eyes nor combated what he later claimed were Lenin's grievous theoretical errors before, during, or immediately after the Second Party Congress for the simple reason that Plekhanov fundamentally agreed with Lenin's organizational views.

Plekhanov seems to have envisioned himself as the man who could impose order upon the Party through the sheer force of his will. True to form, in June of 1905, with Russia experiencing large-scale revolution, he fell back upon his old tactic of threatening to withdraw from leadership in the hope of winning greater concessions. As well as renouncing the presidency of the Party Council, he resigned from *Iskra*'s Editorial Staff, stressing: "I can remain a representative of the Russian Social-Democratic Party *only* in the event that *both fractions* desire this."[85] Plekhanov stressed in August of that same year, "Someone must save the honor of Russian Social Democracy!,"[86] and it is not difficult to imagine whom he had in mind. This time, however, other Russian Social-Democratic

[84] Plekhanov, "O nekotorykh nashikh 'nekhvatakh,'" in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, p. 259.
[85] Plekhanov, "Vykhod iz redaktsii *Iskry*," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, p. 226.
[86] Plekhanov, "Vrazhduiushchie mezhdu soboi bratia," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, p. 319.

leaders did not rush to offer Plekhanov more power. He had overplayed his hand and, far from being thrust back into the decisive leadership role that he so craved, he faded into increasing obscurity and irrelevance.[87]

Even in August 1905, over two years after the Second Party Congress, Plekhanov reiterated his basic views that the masses were relatively inert and aimless on their own and that democratic measures had to be circumscribed without hesitation if necessary, further demonstrating the degree to which his dispute with Lenin was much more of a power-political than a philosophical one. Even at this late date, he criticized the Mensheviks for their "decentralized position that is characteristic of the amorphous masses."[88] In other words, he made the same basic argument that Lenin had made in "What is to be Done?" over three years after the brochure's appearance and after he had supposedly recognized the pernicious nature of Lenin's theories.

Moreover, in his November 1905 article, "Our Situation," Plekhanov reaffirmed his commitment to the philosophy which he had advanced at the Second Party Congress that the ends justify the means. He reminded his readers, "At the Second Party Congress, I said, '*salus revolutiae suprema lex*.' I repeat, in view of what is now taking place in Russia, *salus revolutiae suprema lex*."[89] Thus, Baron's assertion that Plekhanov came to regret his famous formulation at the Second Party Congress "with every sinew of his being"[90] is unjustified. On the contrary, Plekhanov stressed the continued validity of his assertion *over two years* after he had initially made it.

To maintain that Plekhanov was imperious, inflexible, and opposed to a broadly-based democratic organization of the Party is neither to deny his formidable intellectual gifts nor his immense contributions to the genesis and development of Russian Social Democracy. Lenin once rightly noted that Plekhanov had "reared a whole generation of

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[87] Baron, p. 277.
[88] Plekhanov, "Vrazhduiushchie mezhdu soboi bratia," p. 318.
[89] Plekhanov, "Nashe polozhenie," in *Sochineniia*, vol. 13, p. 336.
[90] Baron, p. 242.

Russian Marxists,"[91] and while the "father of Russian Marxism" deserves respect for his talents, one must acknowledge his fundamentally authoritarian and anti-democratic legacy. Plekhanov agreed almost to the letter with Lenin's centralizing theories when he had a commanding position in the Party, even helping to engender Lenin's belief in the virtues of strict Party centralization to control the "unconscious" working masses, and he only began half-hearted, inconsistent, and contradictory attacks upon Lenin as a tactical maneuver designed to reassert his primacy in the Party.

While Plekhanov fundamentally agreed with Lenin's emphasis on the need for strict Party centralization, when a golden opportunity for mass revolution arose in Russia in 1917, Plekhanov did stress the need to carry out a two-stage revolution instead of "telescoping" the bourgeois and Socialist revolutions into one upheaval as Lenin advocated. Plekhanov had insisted on the necessity of a two-stage revolution in Russia as early as *Socialism and Political Struggle*, and Baron may be right in asserting that "Plekhanov's warnings against a premature seizure of power subsequently came back to mock the 'outlaws' who had triumphed over him in 1917."[92]

In insisting on an "orthodox" Marxist revolutionary scheme in Russia, however, Plekhanov disregarded Marx's later assessment of Russia's role in overthrowing capitalism. Marx wrote in the introduction of Plekhanov's 1882 translation of *The Communist Manifesto* that a peasant revolution in Russia could set off a proletariat revolution in Western Europe, and that the prevailing type of communal ownership in Russia might form the basis for a communist course of development.[93] Plekhanov thus took it upon himself to be more Marxist than Marx himself, and while his two-staged revolutionary scheme may have been more felicitous for the Russian people, as Baron and Gavril Popov believe, this should not obscure the fact that the logical outcome of Plekhanovite thought was some sort authoritarian Russian Socialist order.

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[91] Plekhanov, *The Development of the Monist View of History*, 6.
[92] Baron, p. 361.
[93] Ibid., p. 68.

Baron, Plekhanov's most ardent Western supporter, has recently acknowledged that he had earlier downplayed the repellent qualities of Plekhanov's character in his biography, suggesting that he may have minimized attention to "acrimonious affairs" in Russian Social Democracy "because they often showed Plekhanov in a most unfavorable light -- petty, arrogant, overbearing, and unscrupulous." Baron has further noted, "I may have wished to divert my attention from his repellent qualities in order to make possible continuing empathy." Moreover, Baron has asserted that when he began his project on Plekhanov, he "harbored friendly if not uncritical feelings toward our erstwhile Soviet ally, and my aspirations found an immediate outlet in political activity of a leftish sort."[94] Empathy and respect for Plekhanov and esteem for Marxism turned Baron away from Plekhanov's contentious nature, and perhaps they diverted Baron's attention from Plekhanov's basic authoritarian beliefs as well.

Other key historians of Russian Social Democracy, notably Keep and Wildman, who generally did their work in the 1960's, regard Plekhanov as much more anti-authoritarian than he was since he periodically aligned himself with the Mensheviks beginning with the Stockholm Congress of 1906.[95] After it lost out to Bolshevism in the 1917 Revolution, Western historians have regarded Menshevism as the superior variant of Russian Social Democracy. Alan Wildman, for instance, has contrasted Bolshevism, which carried "Lenin's banner of elitism," with Menshevism that allegedly acted as the "champion of worker initiative and democracy," providing a "refuge for all those who could not reconcile themselves to all of the ruthless implications which elitism incorporated."[96] Though Plekhanov remained too independent ever to align himself closely with the Mensheviks, he has benefited from respect by association in Western historiography.

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[94] Baron, *Plekhanov in Russian History*, pp. 194, 197, 198.
[95] Baron, *Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism*, pp. 269, 270.
[96] Allan Wildman, *The Making of a Workers' Revolution: Russian Social Democracy, 1891-1903* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 101, 190.

Plekhanov has also enjoyed a more savory reputation than his record merits since the vanquished often arouse greater admiration than the victors. Leon Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg, for instance, both failures in the immediate political sense, have elicited considerable sympathy in the West, largely since they both met grisly and untimely deaths at the hands of their enemies. Regarding Luxemburg, Western historians, moved by her tragic demise to evaluate her more favorably than would otherwise have been the case, have considered the gifted polemicist to have been a proponent of democracy within Communism largely due to her assertion in her 1918 essay, "On the Russian Revolution," that "freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently."[97]

When evaluating Luxemburg's democratic credentials, however, it is worth noting that the perpetual outsider primarily had herself in mind with this assertion. Moreover, Luxemburg had earlier insisted that "Social Democracy is fundamentally an outspoken opponent of every particularism and national federalism."[98] She staunchly refused to cooperate with the Mensheviks, considering Lenin's Bolsheviks to be the much superior Russian Social-Democratic alternative.[99] Moreover, she argued in "On the Russian Revolution" that the "right of suffrage" represented an "anachronism...in the transition period of the proletarian dictatorship," and she concluded her essay by asserting that, given the chaotic conditions in Russia, Bolshevik political terror was understandable.[100]

Regarding Trotsky, who likewise died a premature and gruesome death, historians have selectively quoted him, like Plekhanov, to demonstrate his supposed democratic inclinations. Isaac Deutscher, for instance, makes much of Trotsky's April 1904 argument in which he stressed the need for an "active and self-reliant proletariat" and warned that in Lenin's system, "The Party organization at first substitutes itself for the Party as a whole; then the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organization; and finally a single

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[97] Rosa Luxemburg, "Zur Russische Revolution," *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 4, ed. G. Radczun (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1970), p. 364.
[98] Luxemburg, *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg*, ed. Dick Howard (London: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 287, 288.
[99] J. P. Nettl, *Rosa Luxemburg* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 357.
[100] Luxemburg, "Zur Russische Revolution," pp. 362-364.

'dictator' substitutes himself for the Central Committee." It is worth noting, however, that before the Second Party Congress, Trotsky argued for a powerful Central Committee with the right to eject all wavering elements from the Party along the lines of Lenin's "What Is to Be Done?" and was even known as "Lenin's cudgel" at the Congress.[101]

Having died a natural death as an old man, Plekhanov cannot elicit claims to martyrdom in the vein of Luxemburg and Trotsky, and he is less celebrated than them largely for this reason. The very fact of his defeat at the hands of Lenin, however, has helped to inspire hagiographic Western literature on him. Baron even invokes Biblical imagery in titling the last chapter of his biography "The Prophet Rejected."[102] The fact remains, however, that while Lenin originally stressed the need for pluralism within the Party only to jettison such pleas in favor of strict centralization along the lines of Plekhanovite thought as his influence increased, Plekhanov advocated ruthless centralization when he held unchallenged leadership in the Party and only initiated tentative and contradictory steps towards advocating greater debate when he sensed that his position was deteriorating.

A politician's desire to assert his dominance when in the position to do so is understandable enough, but while acknowledging human frailty, one must not accord Plekhanov greater democratic sentiments than he possessed. One could argue that a democratic socio-political order is not the best form of societal organization in all cases and that Russian conditions in the early 20th century necessitated authoritarian Socialist leadership of one type or another. If one views a broadly-based Social-Democratic Party with firmly-established democratic safeguards as a societal good, however, then one must acknowledge that Plekhanov, to virtually the same degree as Lenin, deviated greatly from this ideal. Authoritarian Russian Socialism does not represent a bastardization of Plekhanovite thought, is but its legitimate offspring.

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[101] Isaac Deutscher, *The Prophet Armed: Trotsky: 1879-1921* (London: Oxford University Press), pp. 45, 76, 90.
[102] Baron, *Plekhanov: The Father of Russian Marxism*, p. 337.

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Joseph Love, *Crafting the Third World: Theorizing Underdevelopment in Romania and Brazi.* Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1996, 357 pp.

Joseph Love's study compares Romania in the years 1880 to 1945 with Brazil in the years 1930 to 1980, taking the reader–from Europe's depression of 1873 to Latin America's recession of 1973. This overlapping periodization is based on Love's view that there was a "genetic" connection in two major areas. Theory developed in the early 20th century by Romanian thinkers about "unequal exchange" and special problems of "backward" countries was transformed into "dependency theory" by the Brazilian Celso Furtado in his 1948 doctoral thesis at the University of Paris and his 1956 book on Brazil, *Una Economia Dependiente* . Invented in Latin America, the dependency theory, Love demonstrates, emerged in Eastern Europe, if under a different name.

The bridge from theory in Romania to implementation under the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) after World War II came in the Romanian writings of Constantin Stere (who in 1909 was among the first to stress the "vagabond" nature of modern international capitalism that put large firms outside the control of the state) and Mihail Manoilescu (whose works in the 1930s had a particularly strong impact in Iberia and Latin America in the 1930s and 1940s).

In Romanian debates of the 1920s about the nature of economic development, the ideas that would lead to dependency theory were fleshed out by Virgil Madgearu, who anticipated analysts in Latin America by more than three decades when he noted that

foreign firms could leap across tariff walls to establish operations within backward countries; and by Dobrogeanu-Gherea, who took up discussion of structuralism, notably with his vision of a center-periphery relationship between the industrialized west and its agrarian suppliers of foodstuffs and raw materials.

In response to the perception of unequal exchange (the Romanian version of dependency theory), Manoilescu "invented" the theory of protectionism in 1929, which he called the "unequal exchange." This concept would be seized upon in the 1950s by Latin American thinkers, who called themselves structuralists.

Other ideas, such as internal colonialism, modes-of-production (which ostensibly stressed relations of production rather than relations of exchange), and corporatism, appeared in Manoilescu's *The Century of Corporatism* (1934), which supplied a well-articulated ideology calling for economy and polity to be organized into formal corporations supervised by the state.

In modern economic theory, then, Manoilescu is remembered as the father of corporatism and protectionism. His state-corporatist model developed the basis for a nexus between corporatism and Latin American structuralism that ultimately shaped public policy in much of the Third World.

Manoilescu and François Perroux yielded a model of internal colonialism that influenced and shaped the thinking of Brazilians such as Roberto Simonsen, Getúlio Vargas, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso--the latter in his earlier statist incarnation; Argentineans, including especially Raúl Prebisch, who would found ECLA; and Chileans--Aníbal Pinto and Carlos Fredes.

For Manoilescu the issue was not a "free" economy versus a planned one because in "backward" countries such as Romania, the economy was already directed by cartels of industrialists. Rather than letting the consumer masses be exploited, Manoilescu preferred the state to assume directorship of the economy because he believed that only the state could act for the general public interest.

Love believes that Manoilescu so well articulated the basic appeal of structuralism (which called for the state to correct economic imbalances and distortions) that the appeal will not soon disappear.

Statism is defined here as state monopoly and involvement in the economy, when all the economy is run by state-owned enterprises or cooperatives. State-owned enterprises or state owned businesses constituted the overwhelming majority in the former Communist Bloc nations and the Soviet Union. By most estimates there were $100 billion of state-run enterprises only in the Eastern European nations.[1]

Love's book offers a pathbreaking approach that shows how ideas move around the world. He not only suggests the relationship of the German Werner Sombart (who beginning in 1902 coined for public discourse the term "capitalism" as the counterpart to "socialism") but he also examines the rise of ECLA, which made Santiago a pole of development against the U.S. economic theory of specialization (in which each county focuses only on what it can do "best," such as agriculture or mining, and not upon trying to create industrial production to balance against production of raw materials.)

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[1] Jerry, Rosenberg, Dictionary of International Trade (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994), p. 267

ECLA policy led to statism. A clearer title for Love's work, then, would be: "Crafting the Ideology Behind Third World Statism."

The value of Love's work is to show how an ideal emerged to govern the creating of a fantasy Third World. Love himself defines the concept "Third World" in two ways. Throughout the book he uses it to mean economic underdevelopment and backwardness. Only in the conclusion does Love see the Third World as involving an alternative path to development that would allow modernization without accepting ideas of the First or Second Worlds.

Unfortunately, the Second World of Russia came to be the model for most *dependistas* from Romania to Brazil because it gained world economic power against the First World by ignoring the vices of statism. Ironically, the vices of Russian statism, which came to hold sway in countries where "communism" ruled, surfaced for all the world to clearly see in 1989, when Russian statism imploded beginning in East Germany and ending in Romania.

Ironically, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought an end not only to the Soviet Empire but also to Ceausescu's bastion of "dependency theory" in Romania. Since then, in my view (and contrary to that of Love) there is little appeal left to the world in the ideas articulated by Manoilescu.

So what alternative is there? Is global capitalism inevitable? Is globalism a good thing? These are questions that rise after reading Love's book. The only certitude is that the world of Raúl Prebisch disappeared, almost instantaneously.

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Crapol, Edward P. *James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire*. Scholarly Resources, 2000. 157 pp. Paperback $

As riots in Seattle during the recent meeting of the World Trade Organization illustrate, the subject of trade can be a polarizing issue. Not only is it an important economic issue, but it is also defines relationships between nations. As Edward Crapol argues, James G. Blaine designed a blueprint for an American "empire" built upon the foundations of trade. Although Blaine died before his plans could be executed, he charted a course followed by future statesman, including William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Crapol tells us that Blaine did not envision a territorial empire in the fashion of contemporary European powers. Only very late in his career – 1889 to be exact – did Blaine espouse the acquisition of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Cuba as insular territories. Instead, Blaine proposed constructing a "commercial empire" in which American agricultural and industrial products conquered overseas markets. In this Blaine followed the course of empire suggested by his childhood idol, Henry Clay. As a fulcrum to pry open foreign markets Blaine brandished reciprocity. Prior to 1873 the "Plumed Knight" dismissed the concept of reciprocity. But after he witnessed the ill effects of the 1873 depression on farmers in America's heartland, he concluded that exportation of surplus agricultural commodities would restore economic vitality to the region. Moreover, Blaine and James Garfield both sought to build an enduring GOP base in the Midwest by tying the economic well being of the farmer to the Republican policy of expanding overseas markets through reciprocity. Blaine argued that reciprocity would allow the United States to protect its home market and industry with high tariff barriers, but open up overseas markets needing American goods.

Blaine believed his policies would be most effective in the Western Hemisphere. Throughout his life he vigorously championed the cause of Pan Americanism. He believed that the United States and its Latin American neighbors would both benefit from expanded trade, which, in turn, would promote social and political stability. Resulting economic growth would keep meddling European powers from trespassing upon the Monroe Doctrine. Great Britain represented the greatest threat to American supremacy, Blaine argued, and much of his famed twisting of the lion's tail can be traced to this sense of competition. However, Crapol argues that during Blaine's second stint as Secretary of State, President Benjamin Harrison acted more belligerently and frequently ignored his senior cabinet member's plea for restraint.

Structurally, the book is short, consuming less than two hundred pages. There is a detailed chronology at the beginning that is very useful. Source notes appear at the end of each chapter. *James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire* is divided into six chapters beginning with Blaine's "Years of Preparation" at college and as Editor of the *Kennebec Journal* and continue to his second term as Secretary of State. Crapol focuses on all phases of his subject's entire career because in each Blaine advocated his plan for commercial empire in a manner fit for that station. For example, as a Senator Blaine advocated subsidization to an American steamship company to increase trade with Brazil. This occasion, however, led to accusations of political corruption. Throughout his career the "plumed knight" found himself subjected to such taunts. His handling of the Mulligan Letters and his plea "to burn this letter" which fueled the partisan press of the day does leave Crapol a little suspicious. Crapol, however, does not spend much time discussing Blaine's possible collusion in tainted political processes. Instead, he concludes that Blaine's thinking superseded any political favoritism, which was more of a byproduct of his plans for empire, and less a motivation. Through all the controversy, Blaine's blueprints for American

commercial supremacy remained his number one priority, and that friends might benefit from this was, at best, only a secondary consideration. Perhaps Crapol could have expanded a little more on this theme. When discussing the Bering Sea Controversy, the author does not mention that Blaine allowed the North American Commercial Company (NACC) to kill over sixty thousand seals, even though the "modus vivendi" he negotiated with the British government suspended sealing on the Pribiloff Islands. Stephen Elkins, Blaine's campaign manager in 1884, and Whitelaw Reid, a confidant, both held significant positions of the NACC, which was granted monopoly rights in the sealing business in Alaska, and thus stood to lose substantial income during the suspension. While Blaine did submit the matter to international arbitration, he did not "take the high ground" as Crapol argues. Instead, Blaine's desire to eliminate the harmful practice of killing seals at sea (pelagic sealing) also served to protect the financial interests of his friends.

Included is a chapter summarizing Blaine's effect on future policy makers and the manner in which he prepared a younger generation to handle the challenges of the new century. This book is easy to read and will fit well into any class covering the late nineteenth century or the history of American diplomacy. In the end, the reader comes away convinced that James G. Blaine was not the supreme political hack that he is often thought to be, but that he was a profound thinker who deeply pondered his nation's future and charted a course that shaped American history.

By Gregory Dehler, Lehigh University

Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy.* Oxford University Press, 1998. 317 pp. + x.

"TALKING PEACE, WAGING COLD WAR"

By: Kenneth A. Osgood

Robert Bowie, former director of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Policy Planning Staff, and Richard Immerman, winner of the 1990 Bernath Prize from the Society for Historians of American Relations, have co-authored a sympathetic portrait of Eisenhower's foreign policy. Clearly aligned with the "revisionist" school of the Eisenhower presidency, they have provided convincing evidence to refute the traditional view of Eisenhower as a do-nothing president who preferred golf over the duties of the presidency. The authors argue that under Eisenhower's guidance the United States developed a logical, coherent, and ultimately wise national security strategy that shaped American policy for the duration of the Cold War.

According to Bowie and Immerman, an appreciation of Eisenhower's personal values and political philosophy is essential to understand his foreign policy. Consequently, nearly one-third of the book is devoted to.the years preceding Eisenhower's inauguration. Eisenhower emerges here as a truly exceptional individual with a highly-developed sense of leadership. As a candidate, he tried to shape public opinion, to convince Americans of the necessity of a firm response to the Soviet threat, while at the same time warning against the danger of runaway expenditures and budget deficits. Eisenhower, Bowie and Immerman conclude, "campaigned on the most basic of themes: his administration would formulate and pursue a coherent and effective "cold war" national strategy." (79)

The remaining chapters of the book are devoted to analysis of the formation of that strategy, known then and since as the "New Look." This produces a fascinating exposition of the "processes and inputs" that led to the adoption of National Security Council (NSC) document 162/2, the important policy paper that guided the "New Look." Bowie and Immerman devote five chapters to an analysis of NSC 162/2 and the process by which the administration approved and revised it. As such, it is an interesting look at the policymaking process, including bureaucratic politics and presidential leadership. According to the authors, Eisenhower's skillful leadership produced a strategy that rationalized means and ends, that provided for the national defense without sending the nation into bankruptcy, that preserved the fundamental values and free character of American institutions, that prevented the outbreak of general war, and that provided for a protracted "long haul" contest with the Soviet Union for world leadership.

In addition to crafting a coherent Cold War strategy, Bowie and Immerman argue, Eisenhower also remained committed to détente, coexistence, and disarmament. According to the authors, Eisenhower offered Stalin's successors a realistic "chance for peace" in his famous address of April 16, 1953. The agenda it laid out "was a comprehensive program for ending the cold war, starting with the settling of major political issues as a prelude to tackling the radical reduction and control of armaments." When that initiative faltered Eisenhower adopted a "very modest, long-term strategy for making gradual progress by small steps." (225) At the same time, however, Eisenhower realized that the Soviets had no intention of abandoning their basic hostility to the West and were unlikely to compromise on the most contentious East-West issues. Thus, according to Bowie and Immerman, Eisenhower responded to Soviet intransigence by laying out a comprehensive plan for waging cold war.

Hence a major unresolved tension in the book: Eisenhower emerges as both a committed champion of peace and a committed cold warrior. But, it is worth asking, just how much of a "chance for peace" did Eisenhower offer the Soviet leadership? Did he follow-through on his determination to pursue nuclear disarmament? Did he pursue a *realistic* strategy to reduce cold war tensions? Recent studies by "postrevisionist" scholars Walter Hixson, Klaus Larres, J. Michael Hogan, and Martin Medhurst answer all these questions negatively, suggesting that Eisenhower was more interested in propaganda than in disarmament. As Hixson writes, "Eisenhower's speech was a well-conceived propaganda initiative, but the only 'chance for peace' that it offered would have required Soviet capitulation to Western demands." [1]

Indeed, contrary to Bowie and Immerman's claim, Eisenhower established linkages that made anything other than the resolution of minor cold war issues unlikely. In the "Chance for Peace" address, Eisenhower made clear to his audiences that he understood peace meant much more than a reduction of tensions. He requested as proof of Soviet good faith the conclusion of an "honorable" armistice in Korea, an end to hostilities in Indochina and Malaya, and a treaty with Austria. These "deeds" of good faith needed to include as well a united Germany—free to rearm and join the Western alliance. Significantly, and consistent with the administration's commitment to

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[1] Chester Pach and Elmo Richardson suggested the term "postrevisionist" for scholarship that accepts the basic revisionist argument that Eisenhower was an active and skillful leader while arguing that his presidency was not as successful as many revisionists have maintained. See Pach and Richardson, *The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower* (Lawrence, KS, 1991), xiii; Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961* (New York, 1997), 90; Klaus Larres, "Eisenhower and the First Forty Days after Stalin's Death: The Incompatibility of Détente and Political Warfare," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 6:2 (July 1995): 431-469; Martin J. Medhurst, "Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace' Speech: A Case Study in the Strategic Use of Language," *Communications Monographs* 54 (June 1987): 204-220; J. Michael Hogan, "Eisenhower and Open Skies: A Case Study in Psychological Warfare," in *Eisenhower's War of Words: Rhetoric and Leadership* ed. Medhurst (East Lansing, 1994): 137-156.

"liberation," he also three times called for the full independence of East European nations. While requesting proof of Soviet good faith, Eisenhower offered no concessions from the West. The preconditions he set in his "Chance for Peace" address, including German unification and the liberation of Eastern Europe, did not reflect a desire to resolve cold war differences, but to force the Soviet leadership to alter its entire foreign policy in exchange for nothing but goodwill. [2]

It is difficult to quarrel with Bowie and Immerman's claim that Eisenhower had a lasting impact on American national security policy. In asserting Eisenhower's bold leadership, however, Bowie and Immerman do not fully appreciate objective number one of Eisenhower's foreign policy: waging cold war. Victory in the Cold War was the very essence of the "long haul" struggle their book analyzes, and Eisenhower accorded far greater priority to winning the Cold War than to ending it. Eisenhower was indeed *Waging Peace,* but in his view peace was something to be won, not made.

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[2] For further elaboration, see Kenneth A. Osgood, "Form Before Substance: Eisenhower's Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy," *Diplomatic History*, forthcoming. For text of the speech, see *Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower*, 1953, 179-187.

The Early Elizabethan Polity. Stephen Alford. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. xii + 271 pp.

Though there has been a recent surge of interest from Hollywood regarding the life, times and events of the reign of England's first Elizabeth, from the excellent whimsical romance of "Shakespeare in Love" to the abominable and inaccurate "Elizabeth I", scholarly attentions paid to Elizabeth and her reign have been scant in most recent years. Indeed, the early years of the Elizabethan era have seen perhaps the least new scholarly activity as the new millennium approaches: the standard work on the formative years of the reign remains Wallace MacCaffrey's *The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime*, published in 1967, and the standard biography of her Chief Minister, William Cecil, remains Conyers Read's 1955 work, *Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth*, a work which also reinforced the traditional views of a Council rent by faction and Elizabeth as 'Gloriana', playing the factions off one another like a master violinist or puppeteer to gain "harmonious cooperation" within her realm, first proposed in this century by J.E. Neale's 1934 work, *Queen Elizabeth*.[1] Even the standard revisionist views of Elizabeth and of her role in governance, Neville Williams' *Elizabeth the First: Queen of England,* and Christopher Haigh's *Elizabeth I*, were published in 1968 and 1988, respectively.[2] Stephen Alford's work, *The Early Elizabethan Polity* is an important addition to the bodies of work concerned with the early years of Elizabeth's reign and regarding its main subject, William Cecil.

Alford presents a prosopographic and institutional study of Cecil, with a focus on his actions and relations at court and in council, particularly as regards the formation of Scottish

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[1] Wallace MacCaffrey, *The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime*, (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968); Conyers Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth* (New York: Knopf, 1955); J. E. Neale, *Queen Elizabeth I*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Academy Chicago Publishers, 1952). Another important work regarding Elizabethan government is A.G.R. Smith *The Government of Elizabethan England* (New York: WW Norton & Co, 1967).

[2] Neville Williams, *Elizabeth the First: Queen of England* (New York: Dutton & Co., 1968); Christopher Haigh, *Elizabeth I*, (London: Longman, 1988).

policies, policies regarding the succession, the marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots to Lord Darnley, and the settlement of 1568. In this work, Alford seeks to move his analysis beyond a study of faction in the Council, and begins to address more comprehensive questions which, executed properly, would bring a more complete portrait of Elizabethan governance than has heretofore been offered: Who made policy? What part did the Privy Council play in collating debate and deciding policy? And, how did this system work in political practice?[3] He also considers reactions in the face of Norfolk's plot and the Northern rebellion, each of which are analyzed more in terms of their causes, rather than the responses offered to them. He determines, compellingly, that the "political creed" of Cecil and the early Elizabethan Privy Council consisted of three parts: "first, that England was a 'mixed polity'; second, that the 'prerogative of the ruler' was limited by the advice of the Council; and third, that the 'assent of the whole realm' in parliament was needed to effect significant political or religious change"[4] Contrary to Williams' pessimistic view of an over-complacent council and terrified Queen acting without real concert or efficiency that left her, after fourteen years "at odds with her Council, both Houses of Parliament and Convocation, with the religious unity she had striven for lying "in tatters," Alford argues that the Council was "an effective political body" by "even the middle part of the decade [of the 1560's]"[5] Further, in contrast to MacCaffrey, A.G.R. Smith, Haigh and most of the historiography since the eras of Read and Neale, all of whom saw faction as having "rent the Council," Alford asserts that 'faction' in the Council merely reflected "strategic disagreements

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[3] Stephen Alford, *The Early Elizabethan Polity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 6.

[4] Alford, *Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 3. This is in contrast to Haigh's assertion that "Privy Councillors saw royal objection not as a final refusal but as a problem to be circumvented," due to Elizabeth's use of "vacillation" as an overriding political strategy. Haigh, *Elizabeth I*, p. 72.

[5] Alford, *Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 208. This contrasts Williams, *Elizabeth the First*, p. 178.

rather than ideological [ones]," and that the workings of the Council were "fairly smooth" throughout the decade, noting that "disagreement, after all, was not faction."[6]

Alford also makes insightful points regarding the anachronism of such labels as 'domestic' and 'foreign' when applied to the consideration of issues and creation of policy in the early modern period, that the politicians and councilors saw no real distinction between the two, but saw policies regarding issues seemingly as disparate as interrelated in the governance of the realm.[7] He also makes a compelling argument about the role which providential philosophy played in the conceptions of Cecil, arguing against the traditional portrait of Cecil as *politique*, noting that his subject's writings often showed his linking of the spiritual health of the realm with the physical health and political security of the commonwealth, as well as the effectiveness of its governance.[8] He also points out, using Cecil's writings on the subject, that the Elizabethan Council did not "plant" debates in Parliament, but did act in concert with senior MPs, the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Lords, to help shape and manage debate, and pressure the Queen, successfully, more often than not.[9] His successful use of a form of prosopographic method, concentrated on an individual, insures that a deeper portrait of the Cecil of the 1560's emerges, one fully within the politics and polity of his era, acting consciously as an early modern model of Cicero's *vir civilis*: governor, councillor and secretary, a model well-known to Cecil and his contemporaries.[10]

While this book offers many compelling arguments and does an admirable job in melding intellectual and political history using an innovative method, while helping to shift the field of

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6 Alford, *Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 30, 213.
7 Alford, *Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 217.
8 Alford, *Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 26-28.
9 Alford, *Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 215.
10 Alford, *Early Elizabethan Polity*, p. 20-24.

Elizabethan political history away from an obsession with inter-Councillor factional strife, particularly between Cecil and Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, to one which is concerned with the creation and promulgation of policy, it does have its shortcomings. First, the book is somewhat mistitled. Billed as a study of "the early Elizabethan polity," a more apt title for the work would be "William Cecil and the Early Elizabethan Polity," the political nation aside from Cecil gets rather short shrift in this work. Certainly, one can not deny the importance of William Cecil to a study of this nature, however, it is also a mistake to assume a study of Cecil's attitudes, motivations, philosophies and actions is a study of these things as applied to the polity as a whole.

Secondly, Alford gives a great amount of analytical discussion to Cecil's 1563 proposal which would have given the "prerogative power of the crown" to the Privy Council if anything had happened to Elizabeth, in fact, publishing the ultimately rejected proposal in toto as appendix 2 (of 6). While the author does a fine job in illustrating how such a proposal, and the reactions to it, demonstrated the importance of the on-going succession crisis of the 1560's, his focus on that decade leads to a certain lack of context vital to a full understanding of such a proposal, and the man who advanced it. Alford mentions that Cecil played a role on the Council at the end of Henry VIII's reign and during that of Edward VI, however, his discussion of Cecil's role in the machinations of the late 1540's is glossed over with great brevity and with no real depth.[11] Alford offers no analysis of Cecil's possible role in the changing of Henry's will to allow Somerset to take control of the Council after the ascension of the minor Edward VI, and offers no comment on the likely connection between Cecil's proposal of 1563, offered during a succession

[11] The author's briefly mentions the events of the 1540s twice, on neither occasion does Alford offer any discussion of Cecil's role as Northumberland's protégé and the subsequent influence that relationship would have on policies

crisis, and the events which Cecil lived through in Edward's reign. These events saw the succession of a Counciliar government under a Protector of the Realm during a royal minority first fall into the personal rule of one man, the Duke of Somerset, then saw a counciliar *coup d'etat* affected by the Duke of Northumberland which led to arrests and executions of Northumberland's enemies, including Somerset, and finally, saw Northumberland himself attempt to alter the succession at Edward's death by placing his daughter-in-law Jane Grey on the throne for her famous nine days, all of which promoted factionalism and rivalry and was to the detriment of 'good governance'. The fact that Cecil not only lived through these events, but was a prominent political actor in them, beginning his councilar career as Northumberland's protégé, and eventually being excluded from the Marian Council in large part due to perceptions about that relationship, lends a deeper level of understanding for his need to not only promulgate such a proposal as that which he tried to advance in 1563, but also to his desire to find a permanent and stable remedy to the on-going succession crisis of the 1560's, a focus of much of Alford's analysis. Without an examination of this necessary background, Alford's intellectual history, on this point at least, lacks necessary context.

Finally, while the book does a good job in discussing Cecil and events in London, answering the questions 'who made policy?' and 'what part did the Privy Council play?' with a large degree of success, the book is less successful in answering the third of its questions, 'how did it work in political practice?', at least how it all worked outside London and the Court. One certainly gets a sense of how policy was conceived and how policy was promulgated, and the roles of William Cecil in both processes, however, one gains less insight in how policies were implemented and enforced. A full political picture should include all of these factors.

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advanced by Cecil after 1558, or, indeed, his notable exclusion from the Marian Council. Alford, *Early Elizabethan*

Despite these problems, this book is an important addition to both Cecilian and Elizabethan era scholarship. The text is followed by six appendices, all containing primary documents which help to inform the reader regarding points of the author's analysis, and it contains an exceedingly useful bibliography and list of sources on Cecil, which will serve as a good place to begin for those interested in the subjects of the book and for future further scholarship on Cecil and early Elizabethan government. While more time than many of us would like might have to be spent "reeducating" students who only know the 'history' proffered by Hollywood movies on Elizabeth, Stephen Alford's book should take its rightful place as one of the standards by which such an education is undertaken.

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Polity, p. 25, 118.

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